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The Freedom of Navigation Program: A
Study of the Relationship Between Law
and Politics
By WILLIAM J. AcFvEs*
I am master of the earth but the law is mistress of the sea.
-Emperor Antoninus
Law without force is impotent.
-Pascal
I. Introduction
An analysis of the development of the law of the sea reveals a
persistent interaction between law and politics.' Each influences the
other in a relationship that began soon after mankind first looked out
towards the sea.
Maritime states have long been concerned with controlling the
sea and protecting their shores. References to legal norms regulating
maritime commerce and navigation can be found throughout ancient
history.2 These norms, however, emphasized jurisdiction (imperium)
* William Aceves is a Lecturer and Ford Foundation Fellow in International Law at
the UCLA School of Law. He is also a Ph.D student in the Department of Government at
Harvard University. He received his J.D. and an M.A. in International Relations from the
University of Southern California. The author would like to thank John Setear, George
Galdorisi, and Alfred Rubin for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
All opinions and errors remain the responsibility of the author.
1. For purposes of this Article, law is defined as the body of rules, standards, proce-
dures, and institutions governing the relations between and among states, Politics is de-
fined as the tactical and strategic rationale for state action.
2. See JAms B. PRrrcHARD, THE Axcmr NF-Ar EAsT 16-;24 (1958) (dcesibing a
dispute between an Egyptian priest and a Phoenician official regarding maritime jurisdic-
tion that was resolved by reference to legal concepts). See Scnerally R.P. At AD. Op.IoIN
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAV OF THE SEA (19S2); M.D.A. AzUNI, THF NiAnr.E LvLv
OF EUROPE (William Johnson trans., 1806); PERCY FENN, THE. RIGHT OF FISHERY IN TEP.-
RrrontAL WATERS (1926); W. Frank Newton, Inexhaustibiliv as a Law of the Sea Determ-
nant, 16 TEx. INT'L L.J. 369 (1981); Gordon Paulsen, An Historical Ovetvic;v of the
Development of Uniformity in International Maritime Law, 57 Tut- L. RE%,. 1065 (1933).
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rather than ownership (dominium). For example, the Greeks and Ro-
mans exercised limited grants of authority over maritime regions to
regulate maritime commerce.3 This did not imply a right of ownership
over the sea. Indeed, the Digest of Justinian stated that the sea was
common to all, with reference to both ownership and use.4
Eventually, maritime states recognized the advantages of claim-
ing sovereignty over the waters surrounding their land territory.- A
claim of territorial sovereignty allowed greater control of maritime
transit, commerce, and resources. As noted by J.L. Brierly, "[a]t the
dawn of international law most maritime states claimed sovereignty
over certain seas; Venice claimed the Adriatic, England the North
Sea, the Channel, and large areas of the Atlantic, Sweden the Baltic,
and Denmark-Norway all the northern seas."6 Similarly, C. John
Colombos has noted that "[u]p to the end of the eighteenth century
there was no part of the seas surrounding Europe free from the claims
of proprietary rights by individual Powers, nor were there any seas
over which such rights were not exercised in varying degrees. ' '7
Throughout this era, the maritime regions were viewed as a web
stretching across the world's oceans, porous in some areas, impermea-
ble in others.
The most expansive claims of sovereignty were made by Spain
and Portugal. By virtue of two papal bulls in 1493 and the Treaty of
Tordesillas in 1494, Pope Alexander VI divided the New World be-
3. See generally ANAND, supra note 2, at 11; Leslie Macrae, Customary International
Law and the United Nations' Law of the Sea Treaty, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 181, 183-85
(1983); COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUS-roM OF ANCIENT
GREECE AND RomE 367 (1911); PrTMAN POTTi-ER, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEA IN HISTORY,
LAW AND POLrTICS (1924); Percy Fenn, Justinian and the Freedom of the Sea, 19 ANM. J.
INT'L L. 716 (1925).
4. Dio. 1.8.2.1 (MARCIAN, INSTITUTIONUM 3).
5. Ian Brownlie describes four types of territorial regimes: (1) territorial sovereignty;
(2) territory not subject to the sovereignty of any state or states and which possesses a
status of its own (e.g., mandated and trust territories); (3) res nullius, which is susceptible to
acquisition by states but has not yet been placed under territorial sovereignty; and (4) res
comunis, which is not capable of being placed under state sovereignty. IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (4th ed. 1990). See generally WILLIAM
COPLIN, THE FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-31, 35-38 (1966); R.Y. JENNINGS, THE
AcouIsrnON OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1963).
6. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 304 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed.
1984). See generally CHARLES HI.L, THE DANISH SOUND DUES AND THE COMMAND OF
THE BALTIC (1926); Percy T. Fenn Jr., Origin of the Theory of Territorial Waters, 20 At. J.
INT'L L. 465 (1926).
7. C. JOHN COLOMBOs, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 48 (6th ed. 1967).
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tween Spain and Portugal.s In 1604, the Dutch East India Company
retained Hugo Grotius to challenge Portuguese claims of absolute sov-
ereignty in the Indies and to justify Dutch access to the region2 In his
celebrated treatise, Mare Liberum, Grotius defended the freedom of
the seas by arguing that the sea cannot be owned.10 "[T]he sea is one
of those things which is not an article of merchandise, and which can-
not become private property. Hence it follows, to speak strictly, that
no part of the sea can be considered as the territory of any people
whatsoever."" Grotius argued that state interdependence compelled
unrestricted navigation, because no single nation was completely self-
sufficient.' 2
Following Dutch challenges to English attempts to restrict fishing
off the coast of England, English and Scottish jurists presented their
own legal justification for a restrictive maritime regime. In 1635, John
Seldon wrote Mare Clausum in support of these restrictions on foreign
8. D.P. O'CoNNELTL, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 2 (19,2). In 1493,
Pope Alexander VI granted to Spain sovereignty over the land territory located to the %._est
of a line running one hundred leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. The papal dcmarca-
tion provided the basis for the Treaty of Tordesillas between Spain and Portugal. A-.Tur
NUSSBAUM, A CONciSE HISrORY OF THE LAw OF NATIONS 63 (1962). See also B _nv; W.
Duim AND GEORGE D. Wnaus, FOUNDATIONS OF THE PORTUGUESE EN'i.jIF , 172-74
(1977). See generally CHRISTOPHER BELL, PORTUGAL AND THE QUEST FOR THE INDIES
(1974); H. Vander Linden, Alexander VI and the Demarcation of the Maritime and Colonial
Domains of Spain and Portugal, 1493-94, 22 A.. HiST. REv. 1 (1916).
9. CoLo~mos, supra note 7, at 7.
10. Mare Libenun was the twelfth chapter of Grotius' monumental treatise De Jutre
Pradae, which he wTote "to show that war might rightly be %aged against, and prize taken
from the Portuguese, who had wrongfully tried to exclude the Dutch (and others) from the
Indian trade." W.S.M. KNIGHT, THE LiFE AND WoRas OF HUGO GROTfUS SO. % (1925).
"My intention is to demonstrate briefly and clearly that the Dutch-that is to say, the
subjects of the United Netherlands-have the right to sail to the East Indies, as they are
now doing, and to engage in trade with the people there. I shall base my argument on the
following most specific and unimpeachable axiom of the Law of Nations, called a primary
rule or first principle, the spirit of which is self-evident and immutable, to wvit: Every na-
tion is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it." HuGo GpRoTus, THE
FREEDoM OF THE SEAs 7 (Ralph Magoffin trans., 1916). See generally HuGo Gronus
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1992); Alison Reppy, The Gro-
tian Doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas Reappraised, 19 FoRDI-N.I L. Rrv. 243 (1950).
11. GRoiTus, supra note 10, at 34.
12. Id. at 7-9.
God Himself says this speaking through the voice of nature; and inasmuch as it is
not His will to have Nature supply every place with all the necessaries of life, He
ordains that some nations excel in one art and others in another. Why is this His
will, except it be that He wished human friendships to be engendered by mutual
needs and resources, lest individuals deeming themselves entirely sufficient unto
themselves should for that very reason be rendered unsociable.
Id. at 28.
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fishing off the English coast.'3 Seldon argued that the seas could be-
come the exclusive property of coastal states.'4 Referred to as "the
battle of the books," this medieval debate graphically illustrates the
interaction between law and politics. As noted by Grotius, "[t]here
are times when maritime powers want freedom of navigation, and
there are times when coastal states wish to claim exclusive ownership
over parts or the whole of the oceans. The legal outcome depends
upon who dominates whom."'15
Thus, the law of the sea developed through this interaction of
competing desires, of claim and counterclaim. D.P. O'Connell de-
scribed the history of the law of the sea as having been "dominated by
a central and persistent theme: the competition between the exercise
of governmental authority over the sea and the idea of the freedom of
the seas."'1 6 O'Connell notes that the tension between these two inter-
ests has fluctuated throughout the centuries in response to political,
strategic, and economic circumstances. 7
When one or two strong commercial powers dominate or achieve
parity of power, the emphasis in practice has lain upon the liberty of
navigation and the immunity of shipping from local control; in such
ages the seas have been viewed more as strategic than as economic
areas of competition. When, on the other hand, great powers have
been in decline or have been unable to impose their wills upon
smaller States, or when an equilibrium of power has been attained
between a multiplicity of States, the emphasis has lain upon the pro-
tection and reservation of maritime resources, and consequently
upon the assertion of local authority over the sea.18
Over three hundred years later, U.S. maritime policy continues to
evince the inexorable relationship between law and politics.'9 Indeed,
13. JOHN SELDON, OF Tm DOMINION, OR OWNERSHIP OF THE SEAS (1972). See gen-
erally Louise F. BROWN, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (1919); THOMAS FULTON, THE Soy.
EREIONTY OF THE SEA (1911) (describing the historical development of English claims of
dominion regarding the surrounding seas).
14. SELDON, supra note 13, passim. See also WI.LIAM WELWOOD, AN ABRIDOMENT
OF ALL SEA-LAWES (1613) (defending the right of a coastal state to protect fisheries).
15. GROTYUS, supra note 10, at 15.
16. 1 O'CONNELL, supra note 8, at 1.
17. 1&
18. Id.
19. International law plays an integral role in maritime operations. U.S. Navy regula-
tions require naval commanders to observe international law. Article 0605, Observance of
International Law, states:
At all times, a commander shall observe and require his command to observe the
principles of international law. Where necessary to fulfillment of this responsibil-
ity, a departure from other provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized.
[Vol. 19:259
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the United States Freedom of Navigation (FON) program provides an
excellent example of this critical relationship. Established in 1979, the
FON program seeks to preserve the freedoms of navigation and over-
flight by challenging excessive maritime claims whereby coastal states
have sought to restrict or eliminate maritime transit. ° The FON pro-
gram conducts both diplomatic protests and operational assertions to
protect U.S. navigational rights. According to a Department of State
publication:
The U.S. is committed to protecting and promoting rights and free-
doms of navigation and overflight guaranteed to all nations under
international law. One way in which the U.S. protects these mari-
time rights is through the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program.
The program combines diplomatic action and operational assertion
of our navigation and overflight rights by means of exercises to dis-
courage state claims inconsistent with international law and to
demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect navigational freedoms3 1
The FON program was established as a result of the compelling rela-
tionship between law and politics. Political concerns dictated the need
for unrestricted maritime transit and, therefore, the need for a liberal
maritime regime that affirmed the freedom of navigation. At the
U.S. Navy Regulations, art. 0605, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAv%', THE CoN.
MANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 28 (19S7). Similarly, article
1124 states that
Persons in the Department of the Navy, in their relations with foreign nations,
and with the governments and agents thereof, shall conform to international law
and to the precedents established by the United States in such relations.
U.S. Navy Regulations, art. 1124, reprinted in BuRDICK BnrI, IrN'hRtTioo.AL Lv.-
FOR SEAGOING OFFCERS 8 (1986).
20. J. AsHLEY ROACH & ROBERT NV. SirTH, EXCEswsVE MARnTIME CL''. s 3-9
(1994). See generally William J. Aceves, Diplomacy at Sea: U.S. Freedom of Navigation
Operations in the Black Sea, 46 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 59 (Spring 1993); BurEAu OF
OCEANs AND INTERNATIONAL ENVI ONmENTAL AND ScIENnrsc AFFAIRS, U.S. DEF"T OF
STATE, PuB. No. 112, Lnrrs IN THE SEAs: UNTrED STATES RESPOXSES TO En:crs-WE
NAnONAL NMarrrm CLAIMS 1-2 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Lirns L' THE
SEAS].
21. BuREAu OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. D.P'T OF STATE, GIST: U.S. FrEEDom OF
NAVIGATION PROGRAM (Dec. 198S).
22. The implications of a restrictive maritime regime on U.S. navigational freedoms
are significant. By asserting territorial sovereignty over maritime regions, a coastal state
can limit passage through straits and regulate transit along its littorals. Even more limited
grants of sovereignty can still effect the transit of U.S. warships. Moreover, these restric-
tions limit the power projection abilities of the U.S. Navy. In a March 19S communication
to U.S. naval forces, the Secretary of Defense noted that "maximum maritime naval and
air mobility are essential for our military forces to operate effectively. Whether we are
discussing NATO strategy or operations in the Pacific theater, our competitive advantage
lies in the mobility and flexibility of our maritime naval and air forces." Telegram from the
1996]
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same time, international legal principles influenced the development
of U.S. maritime policy.
This Study examines the Freedom of Navigation program and,
more broadly, explores the relationship between law and politics. 2 3
Section II briefly reviews the development of U.S. maritime policy
and its emphasis on the freedom of navigation.2 a Section III examines
the formation and development of the Freedom of Navigation pro-
gram. It also reviews several FON challenges, including diplomatic
protests and operational assertions. Section IV analyzes the legal ba-
ses of the FON program and raises several questions regarding the
validity of operational assertions. According to the United States, the
FON program is based upon the principal sources of public interna-
tional law: customary international law and treaty law. Specifically,
the rules governing the development of customary international law,
as well as the existence of ambiguous provisions in the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention, require the United States to conduct FON opera-
tions to protect its navigational rights. Despite this reliance on inter-
national legal principles, however, the FON program may be criticized
on both legal and normative grounds.
By reviewing the development of U.S. maritime policy, and spe-
cifically, the Freedom of Navigation program, this study seeks to ac-
knowledge the compelling interaction between law and politics.
H. U.S. Maritime Policy: An Overview
Throughout its history, the United States has been aware of its
dependence on unrestricted passage through the world's oceans.
America's geographic position, the locations of its major allies, its reli-
ance on international trade, and the importance of the oceans as
Secretary of Defense to USCINCEUR (Mar. 23, 1988) (declassified Sept. 24, 1991). See
generally LEwis ALEXANDER, NAVIGATIONAL RESTPjCTIONS WITHIN THE NEW LOS CON-
TEXT (1986); MARK JANIS, SEA POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (1976); U.S. DEF'T OF
DEFENSE, OCEAN POLICY REvmw (1993); George Galdorisi, The United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea: A National Security Perspective, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 208 (1995);
Robert Osgood, U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law, 2 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1 (1974);
Elliot Richardson, Law of the Sea: Navigation and Other Traditional National Security
Considerations, 19 SAN Dmo L. REv. 553 (1982).
23. The FON program asserts U.S. navigation and overflight rights. This Article does
not examine the issue of overflight rights. For a discussion of overflight rights and the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention, see Kay Hailbronner, Freedom of the Air and the Convention
on the Law of the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 490 (1983).
24. For purposes of this Article, the freedom of navigation includes the right of inno-
cent passage through the territorial sea, transit passage through international straits and
archipelagos, and high seas freedoms.
[Vol. 19:259
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sources of food, energy, and minerals provide a compelling rationale
for this traditional reliance on the freedom of the seas.25 In addition,
the United States status as a global power is dependent upon its sea
power. Writing at the end of the 19th century, Admiral Alfred Thayer
Mahan acknowledged the critical relationship between national
power, foreign policy, and sea power 26 In his view, no state aspiring
for great leadership status could ignore the importance of sea power.
More recently, the U.S. Department of Defense noted in the white
paper National Security and the Convention on the Law of the Sea that
"[t]he United States has always been a maritime nation and we must
have substantial air and sealift capabilities to enable our forces to be
where and when needed."27 To ensure these capabilities, a principal
element of U.S. maritime policy is the "[a]ssurance that key sea and
air lines of communication will remain open as a matter of interna-
tional legal right and not contingent upon approval by coastal or is-
land nations."'28
The United States support for the freedom of navigation has been
a basic tenet of American foreign policy since the founding of the
American republic. For example, the United States went to war with
the Tripolitan states to uphold the principle of freedom of the seas
rather than acquiesce to demands for tribute.2 9 Similarly, the War of
1812 was fought to assure the sovereignty of American vessels on the
high seas and, more importantly, to assert the right of the United
States to trade freely with Europe. 0
The importance of the freedom of the seas to the United States
continued into the 20th century. In response to Germany's policy of
unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic Ocean during World
War I, the United States emerged from its isolationism and entered
25. Scott Truver, The Law of the Sea and the Military Use of the Ocean in 2010, 45 L,.
L. REV. 1221, 1227 (1985).
26. See ALFRED T. MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEAMPOwR UPON HISTORPY 160)-17S3
(1965).
27. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL SECURTy AND CONVENION ON THE Liu OF
THE SEA 8 (1994).
28. Id.
29. STEPHEN HOWARTH, To SHINING SEA: A HISToRY OFTm UNrrED STATES NAVY
67-78 (1991); Scorr TRUVER, THE STRAn OF GIBRALTAR AND THE MEDiTEPArN 7
(1980). See generally GA.DNER V. ALLEN, OUR NAvY AND THiE BARnAP.Y COPsW.S
(1905).
30. HowATmH, supra note 29, at 324. See generally CIFF'ORD EGAN, NErnPHE PEACE
NOR WAR: FRANco-AzmucAN RELATIONS, 1803-1812 (1983); REGINAL HOPs IAN, THE
WAR OF 1812 (1969).
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the European conflict. 31 Following the war, President Wilson stated in
his Fourteen Points that there must be "absolute freedom of naviga-
tion upon the seas outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war,
except as may be closed in whole or in part by international action for
the enforcement of international covenants." 32 Similarly, U.S. con-
cern regarding freedom of the seas played an important role in the
deteriorating relations between the United States and Germany prior
to World War I1.33
Following World War II, the freedom of navigation was
threatened by political rather than military movements. Accelerating
developments in the law of the sea challenged U.S. maritime inter-
ests. 4 Ironically, the actions of the United States provided a signifi-
cant catalyst to this movement. The 1945 Truman Proclamation
asserted U.S. jurisdiction and control over the "natural resources of
the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas
but contiguous to the coasts of the United States. '35 Following the
Truman Proclamation, other coastal states began extending claims of
territorial jurisdiction beyond their traditional boundaries.3b For ex-
ample, states began extending claims of jurisdiction from three miles
31. HOWARTH, supra note 29, at 298-320. See generally THOMAS BAILEY & PAUL
RYAN, THE LUSITANIA DISASTER: AN EPISODE IN MODERN VARFARE AND DIPLOMACY
(1975); JAMES V. GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR (1920); Ross
GREGORY, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1971);
ERNEST R. MAY, THE WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN ISOLATION, 1914-1917 (1959).
32. WOODROW WILSON, THE FOURTEEN POINTS (1918), reprinted in MAJOR
PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 64-66 (Thomas Patterson ed., 1978).
33. HOWARTH, supra note 29, at 357-83. See generally ROBERT A. DIVINE, THE ILLU-
SION OF NEUTRALITY (1962); ARNOLD OFINER, THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD
WAR (1975).
34. See, eg., BARRY BUZAN, SEABED POLITICS (1976); Ross ECKERT, THE ENCLO-
SURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES (1979); GEORGE SMITH, RESTRICTING THE CONCET OF FREE
SEAS (1980); Lewis Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventory and Prospect,
20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 561 (1983); E.D. Brown, Freedom of the Seas versus the Common
Heritage of Mankind." Fundamental Principles in Conflict, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 521
(1983); W. Paul Gormley, The Unilateral Extension of Territorial Waters: The Failure of the
United Nations to Protect Freedom of the Seas, 43 U. DET. L. REV. 695 (1966); Keith Law-
rence, Military-Legal Considerations in the Extension of Territorial Seas, 29 MIL. L. REV.
47, 66 (1965).
35. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945). For a discussion of the events
leading to the Truman Proclamation, see ANN HOLUICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE
LAW OF THE SEA 18-61 (1981).
36. The rise in new claims can be partially attributed to the significant increase in the
number of new coastal states that appeared following World War II. In 1945, there were 65
coastal states; by 1982, there were 137. Alexander, supra note 34, at 566.
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to twelve miles.37 Some states extended their claims to two-hundred
miles.38 In the absence of a uniform maritime regime, the number of
expanding and competing claims rose dramatically. This ocean enclo-
sure movement placed significant restrictions on maritime transit of
both commercial and military vessels.
In order to clarify the rapidly evolving law of the sea, the United
Nations held conferences in 1958 and 1960 to establish a uniform legal
framework of maritime law 9 The First United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) convened in 1958 and resulted in
the adoption of four conventions: the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone; the Convention on the High Seas; the
Convention on the Continental Shelf; and the Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 4 9 While
the conference successfully addressed several issues, no consensus was
reached on the critical issue of the breadth of the territorial sea 1 In-
deed, soon after the termination of UNCLOS I, several countries ex-
tended their territorial seas from three to twelve miles Thus, the
Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
H) convened in 1960 "for the purpose of considering further the ques-
tions of the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery limits."4 3 How-
37. Robert Krueger & Myron Nordquist, The Evolution of the 2OO-Mile Exchsive Eco-
nomic Zone: State Practice in the Pacific Basin, 19 VA. . IN-'L L. 321, 326 (1979). See
generally PHInLL L. Jassup, THE LAW Op TERmroTAL WATERs A;D MAp.IrTPA JuIS.
DICTION (1927); D.P. O'Connell, The Juridical Nature of the Territorial Sea, 45 BRrr. Y.B.
Ir'L L. 303 (1971).
38. For example, Peru announced on Aug. 1, 1947 that it had extended its territorial
sea to 200 miles. ROACH & SMrr, supra note 20, at 97.
39. See generally THE INTERNATiONAL LAw oF THE SF-v. CASES, Docu mrNs AND
READGS 18-31,249-52 (Gary Knight & Hungdah Chiu eds., 1991); ANAND, supra note 2,
at 176-90. In 1930, the Hague Conference on the Codification of International Law ex-
amined several issues relating to the law of the sea. However, it was unable to resolve the
issue of the breadth of the territorial sea. Alexander, supra note 34, at 564; S!,irri, supra
note 34, at 31-32.
40. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 195S, 15
U.S.T. 1606,516 U.N.T.S. 205; the Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 195S, 13 U.S.T.
231, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; the Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
41. See Arthur Dean, Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accom-
plished, 52 AM. J. I r'L L. 607, 613 (1958); Phillip Jessup, Editorial Comment, Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea: A Study in International Lawmaking, 52 Am. . IN-t'L L.
730, 732 (1958).
42. ANAND, supra note 2, at 185-86.
43. Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doe. ACONF.13!
L.56 (1958).
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ever, this conference failed to establish a definitive rule on the
breadth of the territorial sea.44
On December 17, 1970, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted a resolution calling for the formation of a third conference on
the law of the sea, whose goal would be to establish a uniform conven-
tion on maritime law.45 The United States was a leading force behind
the proposed conference because of concerns that the ocean enclosure
movement threatened the transit of U.S. warships. The United States
was primarily concerned with the proposed extension of the territorial
sea from three nautical miles to twelve, the preservation of freedom of
navigation through straits, and the concept of archipelagic waters.41,
According to a U.N. study on naval arms, a treaty on the law of the
sea had to reconcile three important interests: the security interests of
coastal states, the need to protect the mainly resource-oriented inter-
ests of the developing coastal states, and the necessity of preserving
the freedom of navigation of ships. 4 7
The first session of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) met in New York City in December
1973.48 After eight years of extensive and often contentious negotia-
tions, the Law of the Sea Convention (1982 LOS Convention) was
adopted on April 30, 198249 and opened for signature on December
10, 1982.50
The 1982 LOS Convention was a monumental achievement in
multilateral negotiations.5' It codified the breadth of the territorial
44. ANAND, supra note 2, at 185-90; D.W. Bowett, The Second United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, 9 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 415, 428-35 (1960); Arthur Dean, The
Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight For Freedom of the Seas, 54 AM.
J. INT'L L. 751, 772-89 (1960).
45. G.A. Res. 2750, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/Resi2750
(1970).
46. Elliot Richardson, An American View, in GREENWICH FORUM IX: BRITAIN AND
TrM SEA 208, 212 (M.B.F. Ranken ed., 1984) [hereinafter GREENWICH FORUM].
47. The Naval Arms Race, U.N. Doc. A/40/535 at 46 (1986).
48. See generally ROBERT FRIEDHEIM, NEGOTIATING THE NEw OCEAN REoIME 32
(1993).
49. Id. at 39-40. The Convention was adopted by 130 votes to four, with 17 absten-
tions. The United States, Israel, Turkey, and Venezuela voted against the Convention
while states such as Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Re-
public, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom abstained. Id. at 40.
50. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), reprinted in OFFICIAL TFxr OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983) [hereinafter
LOS Convention].
51. See generally JAmEs SEBENIUS, NEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA (1984); THE
1982 CONVENTION OF Ti= LAW OF THE SEA (Albert Koers & Bernard Oxman eds., 1984).
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sea at twelve miles while recognizing the right of innocent passage for
foreign vessels. 2 It established a contiguous zone that authorized the
coastal state to exercise the control necessary to prevent the infringe-
ment of its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws within
twenty-four miles of its coast 5 3 It also established an exclusive eco-
nomic zone that granted the coastal state exclusive jurisdiction over
all natural resources within 200 miles of its coast.54 It clarified the
rights and obligations of archipelagic states as well as the status of
straits used for international navigation-5 It established a regime for
the exploitation of the deep seabed.- In addition, the Convention
addressed the protection and preservation of the maritime emiron-
ment, marine scientific research, and the development and transfer of
marine technology.5 7
Despite its interest in codifying the law of the sea, the U.S. dele-
gation at UNCLOS I voted against the 1982 LOS Convention.-s
While the United States was pleased with the overall make-up of the
Convention, it was unwilling to accept the deep seabed mining provi-
sions.59 As a result, the Reagan Administration subsequently an-
52. See LOS Convention, supra note 50, arts. 3 & 17.
53. See id. art. 33.
54. See id. arts. 56 & 57.
55. See id. pts. H-IV. See generally SEBENrUS, supra note 51; THE 1932 Co.-riNro-.
OF THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 51.
56. See generally SEBEMUS, supra note 51; THE 1932 Com7.-N, O or THE LA,: or
THE SEA, supra note 51.
57. See generally SEBEnmus, supra note 51; THE 1932 CoNVENToN oF THE Lv; or
THE SEA, supra note 51.
58. At the Final Session of UNCLOS III, Thomas Clingan (Head of the U.S. Delega-
tion) noted:
The United States recognizes that certain aspects of the Convention represent
positive accomplishments. Indeed, those parts of the Convention dealing %ith
navigation and overflight and most other provisions of the convention serve the
interests of the international community... Unfortunately... the deep seabad
mining regime that would be established by the Convention is unacceptable and
would not serve the interests of the international community.
REPORTS OF THE UNrTED STATES DELEGATION To THE TmnRD UNrrED NATiO;S Con.
FERENCE ON THE LAw OF THE SEA 665-66 (Mvyron H. Nordquist & Choon-ho Park eds.,
1983) [hereinafter REPORTS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION].
59. Part XI of the LOS Convention provides that the seabed and ocean floor beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction are considered the common heritage of mankind. LOS
Convention, supra note 50, part XI. No state or natural person can claim or exerc'ise sover-
eignty over any part of this area. Id. More importantly, the Convention established a
controversial deep seabed mining regime. For a discussion of this contentious issue, s2e
ALXANDRA PosT, DEEP5EA M N AND aTm Law oF Tm SEA (1933): Charles Biblowit,
Deep Seabed Mining: The United States and the United Nations Convention an the Law of
the Sea, 58 ST. JoHN's L. RE. 267 (19S4); John King Gamble, Jr., Assessing the Reality of
the Deep Seabed Regime, 22 SAN DIEGO L. Rv. 779 (19,5); Michael Hardy, The Law of
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nounced that the United States would not sign the 1982 LOS
Convention.6° According to President Reagan, the decision to forego
the Convention was based on objections to the deep seabed mining
provisions.61 President Reagan indicated, however, that the provi-
sions of the Convention dealing with traditional uses of the oceans
confirmed existing maritime law and practice and were consistent with
U.S. interests.62 A National Security Decision Directive issued in De-
cember 1982 stated that while the United States would not sign the
Convention, it would "continue to protect U.S. navigation, overflight,
and related security interests in the seas through the vigorous exercise
of its rights against excessive maritime claims." 63
the Sea and the Prospects for Deep Seabed Mining: The Position of the European Commu-
nity, 17 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 309 (1986); David Larson, Deep Seabed Mining: A Defini-
tion of the Problem, 17 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 271 (1986).
60. Statement by the President on the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 18 WEEKLY
CoMp. PREs. Doc. 887 (July 9, 1982) [hereinafter President's Statement on the Conven-
tion]; BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POL'Y No. 416, LAW
OF THE SEA AND OCEANS POLICY (July-Aug. 1982). According to President Reagan, there
were several problems with the deep seabed mining regime including:
(1) provisions that would actually deter future development of deep seabed min-
eral resources, when such development should serve the interest of all
countries;
(2) a decision-making process that would not give the United States or others a
role that fairly reflects and protects their interests;
(3) provisions that would allow amendments to enter into force for the United
States without its approval as this is clearly incompatible with the U.S. ap-
proach to such treaties;
(4) stipulations relating to mandatory transfer of private technology and the pos-
sibility of national liberation movements sharing in benefits; and
(5) the absence of assured access for future qualified deep seabed miners to pro-
mote the development of these resources.
President's Statement on the Convention, supra, at 1-2.
There was a significant debate in the United States about whether to sign the LOS
Convention. See, e.g., Richard Hudson, The "Ripoff for the Rich" in Sea Law Draft, N.Y.
TImEs, Apr. 18, 1981, at A20; William Safire, The Great Ripoff, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1981,
at A23; John Stevenson, Don't Scuttle the Sea Law; Improve the Draft, N.Y. TrItEs, Apr. 10,
1981, at A30. See generally JAhms MORELL, THE LAW OF TUm SEA: AN HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE 1982 TREATY AND ITS REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES (1992); Leigh
Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for American Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF.
1006 (1982); Elliot Richardson, The United States Posture Toward the Law of the Sea Con.
vention: Awkward But Not Irreparable, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 505 (1983).
61. National Security Decision Directive No. 43 (July 9, 1982) (declassified Aug. 22,
1990).
62. Id.
63. National Security Decision Directive No. 72 (Dec. 12, 1982) (declassified Aug. 10,
1992).
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On March 10, 1983, the Reagan Administration released the U.S.
Oceans Policy Statement.64 President Reagan noted that the United
States "has long been a leader in developing customary and conven-
tional law of the sea. Our objectives have consistently been to provide
a legal order that will, among other things, facilitate peaceful, interna-
tional uses of the oceans and provide for equitable and effective man-
agement and conservation of marine resources." 65 President Reagan
then announced that the United States was prepared to accept and act
in accordance with the balance of interests relating to traditional uses
of the oceans-such as navigation and overflight-as codified in the
1982 LOS Convention. "In this respect, the United States v1l recog-
nize the rights of other States in the waters off their coasts, as re-
flected in the Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the
United States and others under international law are recognized by
such coastal [s]tates." 66 In addition, the United States would exercise
and assert its navigation and overflight rights on a worldwide basis in
a manner consistent with the Convention. President Reagan warned,
however, that "[t]he United States will not.., acquiesce in unilateral
acts of other States designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the
international community in navigation and overflight and other re-
lated high seas uses."'67
The United States maintained its criticisms of the 1982 LOS Con-
vention throughout the Reagan Administration. In 1984, James Ma-
lone, then Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, reiterated the Administration's
criticism of Part XI of the Convention.6 8 He added, however, that the
provisions regarding navigation codified customary international law.
Thus, the United States would "further those acceptable provisions of
the convention which are based on customary law as consistently as
possible in order to assure other states of U.S. intentions and in order
64. Statement by the President on United States Oceans Policy, 19 \VEE.:LV COMP.,
PREs. Doc. 383 (Mar. 10, 1983) [hereinafter President's Statement on US, Oceans Policy].
At the same time, President Reagan announced that the United States was proclaimin- a
200-mile exclusive economic zone. Id. See also BuREAu OF PUBLic AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, CuRRENT PoLCY No. 471, OCEANS POUCY AND THE E.xCLUSIVE Eo:xo!.irc
ZoNE (Mar. 10, 1983).
65. President's Statement on U.S. Oceans Policy, supra note 64.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. BuREu OF PUBUC AFFAIRS, U.S. DF,'T OF STATE, CURRENT POL'Y No. 617,
FREEDOM AND OPPoRTUITmy: FOUNDATIONS FOR A DYNAMIc Na~o.IiAL OCZe*;3 POL-
IcY (Oct. 1984) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FR.EDOM AND OFrORTUNITI] See
generally James Malone, Who Needs the Sea Treaty?, 54 FonREGNr Po'v 44 (1934).
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to promote certainty and stability."69 Moreover, in furtherance of
President Reagan's earlier pronouncement, the U.S. Navy would con-
tinue to exercise its navigational rights and freedoms globally.70
In those instances in which coastal state claims are inconsistent with
customary law, exercises are openly carried out. If a coastal state
protests, the United States by reply note stipulates the navigational
right or freedom involved, the manner in which it has been circum-
scribed, and the U.S. resolve to continue to exercise such rights and
freedoms.71
Ambassador Malone cited two recurring areas that were subject to
challenge: requirements of advance notification before entry into the
territorial sea and claims to historic bays.72
In March 1986, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Inter-
national Affairs John Negroponte indicated that the United States still
considered the 1982 LOS Convention to be unacceptable because of
the deep seabed mining provisions.73 He added, however, that the
United States would continue to act in accordance with the balance of
interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans.74 Secretary Negro-
ponte noted that the main purpose of U.S. maritime policy was to pre-
serve and promote traditional, international navigational freedoms.
To secure these freedoms, the United States pursued a three-step pol-
icy.75 First, the United States conducted bilateral discussions with
many countries in order to guide the development of state practice
toward acceptance of the international law of the sea as reflected in
the 1982 LOS Convention. 76 Second, the United States began to for-
mally protest what it considered to be excessive claims of other gov-
ernments in order to preserve its juridical position.77 Third, the
69. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FREEDOM AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 68, at 3.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3-4. See generally Yehuda Blum, The Gulf of Sidra Incident, 80 Am. J. INT'L
L. 668 (1986); L.F.E. Goldie, Historic Bays in International Law: An Impressionistic Over-
view, 11 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & Com. 211 (1984).
73. John D. Negroponte, Address at the 10th annual seminar sponsored by the Center
for Oceans Law and Policy (Mar. 14,1986), in BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, CURRENT POL'Y No. 819, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. OCEANS POLICY 1
(May 1986) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS].
74. According to Secretary Negroponte, "[t]he United States is now engaged in a de-
liberate, methodical process of promoting the universal application of rules of international
law reflected in the nonseabed parts of the convention." Id.
75. Id. at 1-2.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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United States exercised its maritime rights to illustrate national com-
mitment.78 The United States maintained this policy throughout the
Reagan and Bush Administrations.79
On December 27, 1988, President Reagan announced that the
United States would extend its territorial sea from three to twelve
nautical miles pursuant to the 1982 LOS Convention. ' O In his procla-
mation, President Reagan noted that international law recognizes the
right of coastal states to exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction over
their territorial seas to twelve miles. The United States would, there-
fore, extend its territorial sea accordingly. However, the United
States also recognized the right of innocent passage through its terri-
torial waters.8'
In 1990, the United Nations began negotiations designed to ad-
dress the criticisms of the deep seabed mining provisions in the 1982
LOS Convention.P Upon taking office, the Clinton Administration
initiated a detailed review of the U.S. position on the Convention. In
May 1993, the Administration announced its intention to participate
in the U.N. efforts to reform the disputed provisions-' 3 An agreement
was subsequently reached to reform the deep seabed mining provi-
sions.84 It was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on July 28,
78. Id.
79. 136 CONG. REC S5,548-49 (1990). Former Assistant Secretary of State James Ma-
lone noted that the Bush Administration continued to pursue the policy established by
President Reagan in the 1983 Ocean Policy Statement. Id.
80. Proclamation No. 5928,54 Fed. Reg. 777 (19SS). See generally Henry Arruda, The
Extension of the United States Territorial Sea: Reasons and Effcts, 4 Cot. J. INT'L L. 697
(1989).
81. Proclamation No. 5928, supra note SO.
82. See generally Jonathan Chamey, The United States and the Revision of the 19S2
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 23 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 279 (1992); David Larson,
An Analysis of the Ratification of te UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 23 OCEAn
Dn,. & INT'L L. 287 (1995).
83. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL SECURrrY AND ThE COwaTION oi THE
LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 27, at 3. As a result of extensive interagency review, the
Clinton Administration concluded that: (a) the U.S. should provide leadership to find so-
lutions to the Part XI dilemma; (b) the non-seabed provisions of the Convention are the
appropriate legal framework for governance of the oceans; and (c) the U S. should, as a
matter of high priority, become an active participant in efforts to reform the Con,,ntion.
Id. See also U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, OCEAN POLiCY REVIEW, supra note 22. passum
84. The new agreement ensures that the United States has a significant ro!e in deter-
mining future decisions regarding possible deep seabed mining. It also requires that the
administration of the seabed mining regime to be based on free-market principles. U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES TO SIGN SEABED MINING AGREEMErr (July 1, 1994).
See also Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Aides Report Compromise on Sea Mining, N.Y. TIMEs,
Mar. 10, 1994, at A10.
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1994.85 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright
signed the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on July 29,1994
(Agreement).86
Subsequently, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held
hearings on the 1982 LOS Convention and the new Agreement. 7 In
his testimony before the Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for
Oceans David Colson noted:
The significance of the new Agreement, which will form an integral
part of the Law of the Sea Convention, not only lies in the fact that
it solves the specific problems articulated by the United States with
respect to Part XI of the Convention. It also opens the door for
United States acceptance of the Convention and brings within reach
our long-term and bipartisan goal of a comprehensive and widely
supported law of the sea convention.88
Similarly, John McNeill, Senior Deputy General Counsel for Interna-
tional Affairs and Intelligence for the Defense Department, stated in
his testimony that:
[The] Department of Defense [DOD] considers the legal frame-
work which the convention establishes to be essential to its mission.
That framework assures our operational mobility and flexibility,
helps to avoid conflict and promotes the rule of law. From an oper-
ational, policy, and legal perspective, DOD supports the United
States becoming party to the convention. 89
In its 1994 white paper, the Defense Department wrote that the
1982 LOS Convention is favorable because: (1) it confirms traditional
high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight; (2) it details passage
rights through international straits; and (3) it reduces prospects for
disagreement with coastal nations during operations by providing an
internationally recognized set of rules concerning operational rights in
the marine environmentf 0 "A universal Convention is the best guar-
85. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, U.N. Doc. A/481L.60 (1994).
86. Statement by Ambassador Madeleine Albright, Press Release USUN #107-(94)
(July 27, 1994).
87. Current Status of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, Hearings Before the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1994) [hereinafter
Hearings].
88. Id. at 13.
89. Id. at 18.
90. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE CONVENION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 27, at 1-6.
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antee of avoiding situations in which U.S. forces must be used to as-
sert navigational freedoms, as well as the best method of fostering
growth and use of various conflict avoidance schemes which are con-
tained in the Convention." 91
On October 6, 1994, President Clinton forwarded the 1982 LOS
Convention and the 1994 Agreement to the Senate for its advice and
consent.92 In his transmittal letter, President Clinton noted that "[t]he
United States has basic and enduring national interests in the oceans
and has consistently taken the view that the full range of these inter-
ests is best protected through a widely accepted international frame-
work governing uses of the sea."93 Therefore:
91. Id. at i. The Department of Defense (DOD) white paper added that "[rleliance
upon customary international law in the absence of the modified Convention %% ould repre-
sent a necessarily imprecise approach to the problem as well as one which requires the
United States to put forces into harm's way when principles of law are not universally
understood or accepted." Id. According to John Stevenson & Bernard Oxman, Comment,
The Future of the United Nations Convention on the Law of te Sea, S3 AM.. J. NIt'L L. 4S3,
492 (1994):
[G]overnments are more inclined to respect obligations to which formal consent
has been given by the highest political authorities. Even if the Convention is now
generally declaratory of customary international law, this leaves much room for
argument about important details.... [Wlithout widespread ratification, inevita-
ble 'violations' are more easily interpreted as evidence that state practice, the
ultimate source of customary law, is not necessarily rooted in the Convention.
Id.
92. S. Treaty Doc. No. 39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. III-IV (q94). See also Marian Nash
(Leich), U.S. Practice: Contemporary Practice of te United States Relatng to Intcrnational
Law, 89 A_. J. hNT'L L. 96, 112 (1995).
93. Leich, supra note 92, at 112. In the transmittal letter, President Clinton stated that
the primary benefits of the LOS Convention to the United States include the following:
The Convention advances the interests of the United States as a global mari-
time power. It preserves the right of the U.S. military to use the world's eceans to
meet national security requirements and of commercial vessels to carry s.a-going
cargoes. It achieves this, inter alia, by stabilizing the breadth of the territorial sea
at 12 nautical miles; by setting forth navigation regimes of innocent passage in the
territorial sea, transit passage in straits used for international navigation, and
archipelagic sea lanes passage; and by reaffirming the traditional freedoms of nav-
igation and overflight in the exclusive economic zone and the high seas beyond.
The Convention advances the interests of the United States as a coastal state.
It achieves this, inter alia, by providing for an exclusive economic zone out to 2-0
nautical miles from shore and by securing our rights regarding resources and arti-
ficial islands, installations and structures for economic purposes over the full ex-
tent of the continental shelf. These provisions fully comport with U.S. oil and gas
leasing practices, domestic management of coastal fisheries resources and interna-
tional fisheries agreements.
As a far-reaching environmental accord addressing vessel source pollution,
pollution from seabed activities, ocean dumping, and land-based sources of
marine pollution, the Convention promotes continuing improvement in the health
of the world's oceans.
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[e]arly adherence by the United States to the Convention and the
Agreement is important to maintain a stable legal regime for all
uses of the sea, which covers more than 70% of the surface of the
globe. Maintenance of such stability is vital to U.S. national secur-
ity and economic strength. 4
Thus, President Clinton recommended that the Senate give early and
favorable consideration to the 1982 LOS Convention and the
Agreement.
The 1982 LOS Convention entered into force for member states
on November 16, 1994.95 The Agreement Relating to the Implemen-
tation of Part XI provides for its provisional application on that date
pending its formal entry into force. Article 2 of the Agreement pro-
vides that the Agreement and Part XI of the 1982 LOS Convention
shall be interpreted and applied together as a single instrument.16 It
adds, however, that in the event of any inconsistency between the
Agreement and Part XI, the provisions of the Agreement shall
prevail.97
In light of the essential role of marine scientific research in understanding
and managing the oceans, the Convention sets forth criteria and procedures to
promote access to marine areas, including coastal waters, for research activities.
The Convention facilitates solutions to the increasingly complex problems of
the uses of the ocean-solutions that respect the essential balance between our
interests as both a coastal and a maritime nation.
Through its dispute settlement provisions, the Convention provides for
mechanisms to enhance compliance by Parties with the Convention's provisions.
Id. at 112-13.
The report submitted by Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the President stated
that "[Ihe interested Federal agencies and departments of the United States have unani-
mously concluded that our interests would be best served by the United States becoming a
Party to the Convention and the Agreement." S. Treaty Doc. No. 39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
V-XI (1994).
94. S. Treaty Doc. No. 39, supra note 93.
95. Article 308 of the LOS Convention provides that it will enter into force one year
from the date that a 60th instrument of ratification is deposited with the Secretary General
of the United Nations. LOS Convention, supra note 50, art. 308. A 60th instrument of
ratification was deposited on November 16, 1993. As of April 1995, 74 states were parties
to the LOS Convention. See generally Jonathan Charney, Entry Into Force of the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 381 (1995).
96. LOS Convention, supra note 50, art. 2.
97. Id. See generally D.H. Anderson, Legal Implications of the Entry Into Force of the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 44 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 313 (1995); Law of the Sea
Forum: The 1994 Agreement on Implementation of the Seabed Provisions of the Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, 88 Am. J. INT'L L. 488 (1994).
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HI. The Freedom of Navigation Program
Freedom of navigation has been the principal objective of U.S.
maritime policy throughout the history of the United States. Thus, the
development of the Freedom of Navigation program is a natural ex-
tension of this policy.
A. The Origins of the FON Program
The origins of the Freedom of Navigation program can be found
in the negotiations conducted during UNCLOS III. Specifically, the
development of the FON program was motivated by two events which
occurred during UNCLOS III: a 1977 National Intelligence Estimate
study on expanding maritime jurisdiction and the renegotiation of the
Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT).
Soon after his appointment as President Carter's Special Repre-
sentative to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, Elliot Richardson became concerned by the continuing prolifera-
tion of territorial claims by coastal nations s According to Ambassa-
dor Richardson, the effective deployment of the U.S. Navy required a
unified, international consensus on the law of the sea.9 The Ambas-
sador believed that U.S. insistence that the freedom of navigation was
essential, or that the United States was prepared to assert its rights
against objectionable claims, would be insufficient to protect U.S. in-
terests.1"o Specifically, "[i]f deployments to distant regions of the
world require the U.S. to defy the claims of states along the way, they
entail a high risk of political, economic or even military conflict."''
Thus, Ambassador Richardson argued that the United States had a
significant interest in promoting the development of a widely accepted
body of international law for the oceans.102
98. Alan James, A Response to Professor Golde" The Quest for Ocean Lan, and the
American Experience, 1 INTL PROP. I rmiENr J. 409, 413 (19,3).
99. Department of State Press Release, No. 171,2-12 (July 13,1979). The Joint Chiefs
of Staff supported U.S. participation in UNCLOS 1I in order to preserve maximum opera-
tional mobility and flexibility of U.S. forces around the world, at minimum political and
economic cost. Colonel W. Hays Parks, Crossing the Line, 112 NAvAL. Ir ,r. PP.oc. 49.42
(1986).
100. "Our strategic objectives cannot be achieved unless the legitimacy of these princi-
ples is sufficiently accepted by the world at large so that their observance can b2 carried
out on a routine operational basis." Department of State Press Release, supra note 99.
101. Id.
102. In 1976, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had noted in testimony before the
Senate that the Carter Administration's concerns with the mounting legal threats
presented by the ocean enclosure movement. According to Secretary Rumsfeld:
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Due to these concerns, Ambassador Richardson commissioned
several U.S. intelligence agencies to conduct a study regarding the na-
tional security implications of the growing proliferation of excessive
maritime claims. °3 He requested the study in order to show that the
"creeping jurisdictions" problem was a matter of significant national
security concern.104 The resulting National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE), prepared by the National Security Intelligence Group, indi-
cated that a widely accepted law of the sea treaty might be useful in
limiting the proliferation of state claims. However, the NIE study
concluded that such a treaty would not be sufficient to safeguard U.S.
navigational freedoms.
Another factor that influenced the development of the Freedom
of Navigation program occurred at the conclusion of the sixth session
of UNCLOS III, which took place from May 24 to July 15, 1977.105
During the sixth session, negotiations by the Committee I (Seabed)
delegates, under the direction of Jens Evensen, increased the overall
attractiveness of the deep seabed mining provisions.10 6 While the
Committee I negotiations did not resolve the fundamental problems
regarding deep seabed mining, the resulting "Evensen" text was gen-
erally viewed as a useful basis for further negotiation.10 7 As Ambas-
sador Richardson noted, the text "offered real prospect that the
impasse on seabed mining issues could be resolved on terms accepta-
ble to both the developed and developing nations." ' However,
when the Informal Composite Negotiating Text was released follow-
ing the conclusion of the sixth session, the Evensen text on seabed
mining had been significantly altered by the Chairman of Committee
I, Paul Engo. 0 9 The new text had been drafted without consulting the
As we enter the last quarter of the 20th Century, the legal and political restric-
tions placed on freedom of mobility are changing the world and impacting on our
strategic mobility capability. Our position in the Law of the Sea negotiations
stresses, among other things, unimpeded transit through and over international
straits. This principle applies to surface movements as well as to overflight. With-
out this freedom, our mobility and logistic resupply in future contingencies could
be impeded.
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 363 (1976).
103. MARKUS SCiiMIDT, COMMON HERITAGE OR COMMON BURDEN? 132-33 (1989).
104. Letter from Elliot Richardson to William Aceves (June 11, 1990) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Richardson correspondence].
105. See Reports of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 58, passim.
106. Id
107. SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 134.
108. DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 19, 1977, at 390.
109. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62WP.10; see also REPORTS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, supra
note 58, at 162-84.
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developed countries and placed heavier financial and economic bur-
dens on them.110
According to Ambassador Richardson, the composite text was
now fundamentally unacceptable and could not be viewed as a re-
sponsible contribution to further negotiation. As a result, he recom-
mended to President Carter that the United States undertake a
careful review of the substance and procedure of UNCLOS IM."' To
strengthen its bargaining position at the Conference, the U.S. negoti-
ating team emphasized that the United States could easily dispense
with the treaty." 2 Ambassador Richardson abandoned the position
he had taken with the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate,
and the Navy League to promote the Conference. He also reversed
the Administration's position on seabed mining legislation in order to
create the impression that the United States was prepared to go ahead
with deep seabed mining under domestic legislation." 3
In late 1977, Ambassador Richardson and Richard Darman,
Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, drafted a proposed mini-treaty
to be developed outside the framework of UNCLOS III that would be
brought into effect only if the Conference did not reach a satisfactory
agreement." 4 The substance of the mini-treaty was disclosed in
Darman's 1978 article The Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Inter-
ests."' The article emphasized that the failure to achieve a compre-
hensive law of the sea agreement would not hinder U.S. strategic
interests. Indeed, he posited that it might prove beneficial to the
United States. Darman suggested that if an acceptable agreement
could not be reached, the United States should wait for a more
favorable negotiating climate, while continuing deep seabed mining
within the framework of a mini-treaty.116 As to the protection of navi-
gational freedoms, Darman noted that the legal status of foreign wa-
ters would not be a determinative constraint on U.S. foreign policy. If
110. Scwm=T, supra note 103, at 135.
111. DE,'T ST. Bum-, supra note 108, at 390.
112. Richardson correspondence, supra note 104, at 1.
113. ScHmIDT, supra note 103, at 136-37.
114. Richard Darman, The Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests, 56 FoarEici AFF.
373, 393 (1978). See generally, H. GARY KNIGHT, CONSEQUENCES OF NON-ArREEM .ME.Tr
AT THE TinzD LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE (1976); THm LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. INER.
Es AND ALTHRNATrvEs 133-48 (Ryan Amacher & Richard Sweeney eds., 1976);
Anthony D'Amato, An Alternative to the Law of the Sea Convention, 77 Am. L INTL L
281 (1983).
115. Darman, supra note 114, at 393.
116. Id. at 395.
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the United States felt compelled to move militarily, it would presuma-
bly do so regardless of international law.117
According to Ambassador Richardson, while the idea of the
mini-treaty was useful in the negotiating process, it was never consid-
ered a realistic option. The mini-treaty was introduced at that stage of
the negotiations because the United States was "seeking to exert
every possible pressure on the Conference to make concessions on
seabed mining, and in the process attempted to create as much verisi-
militude as possible for the perception that the United States and
other industrialized countries were prepared to go forward outside the
Treaty."" 8 Ambassador Richardson added that the mini-treaty was
"a device by which to give colleagues from the Third World in the
Conference a basis for the belief that we did have an alternative
outside the Convention."' 19
By 1978, a growing consensus was developing that the United
States should be prepared to assert its navigational rights, even if the
execution of such rights would conflict with the territorial claims of
other coastal states. Throughout UNCLOS III, the Defense Depart-
ment had not conducted naval and air maneuvers in disputed waters
in deference to the ongoing law of the sea negotiations. However,
naval officials began arguing that the United States should no longer
refrain from exercising its perceived maritime rights. 2 ° This concern
was shared by Ambassador Richardson who felt that the United
States was not reacting consistently to territorial claims perceived to
be incompatible with U.S. maritime rights.12 1
As a result, Ambassador Richardson persuaded National Security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to set up a task force to examine the
possibility of ensuring U.S. navigational freedoms without concluding
a treaty, and to develop a systematic approach to the regular exercise
of these freedoms. 22 The study recommended a "show of the flag" to
demonstrate American resolve towards its rights under international
117. Id. at 377.
118. GPEENWicH FORUM, supra note 46, at 210-11. Richardson noted, however, that
while the notion of the mini-treaty was a useful one at that stage of the negotiations, "it
was never realistic, any more than was, and is, the reciprocal deep seabed mining legisla-
tion which has been adopted by Britain, Japan, France, Germany and the United States."
Id. at 211.
119. Id.
120. ScHMiDT, supra note 103, at 144.
121. Elliot Richardson, Dogfight A Lesson for U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 30, 1981, at E17.
122. SClMIDT, supra note 103, at 136-37.
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law."23 It also recognized that a proliferation of maritime claims
which purported to limit navigation and overflight rights beyond three
miles might endanger U.S. interests."-4 In March 1979, Brzezinski di-
rected the Department of Defense to develop a plan for implementing
the Task Force recommendations.'25 The plan was worked out by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by Brzezinski. 116 In July, the Joint
Chiefs sent directives to Navy and Air Force commanders instructing
them that they were authorized to approach coastal states to within
three miles.127
B. The Initiation of the FON Program
In August 1979, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Com-
mand (CINCLANT) forwarded a classified memorandum on the
Freedom of Navigation program to naval units of the Atlantic fleet.128
According to the communication, the United States was concerned
that many countries were beginning to assert jurisdictional boundaries
that far exceeded traditional claims. The FON program had been es-
tablished to warn countries that the United States would not tolerate
claims having an adverse impact on maritime transit. The memoran-
dum stated that "in the future, there will be planned exercises, transits
and overflights by Naval and Air Forces for the purposes of asserting
U.S. rights in the face of excessive claims."' 2 9 According to the CIN-
CLANT communication, U.S. maritme policy would now protest:
* all territorial sea claims in excess of twelve nautical miles and se-
lected claims between three and twelve nautical miles, especially
those that overlap an international strait.
* all claims inhibiting navigation through waters that the United
States views as a high seas corridor.
* all claims requiring advance notification for warships, or that re-
strict warship passage in any way.
- rules for "innocent passage" through territorial seas which are
substantially different from established provisions.
123. Id. at 144.
124. Bernard Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
Eighth Session, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (19S0).
125. Scimir, supra note 103, at 136-37.
126. Ox-MAN, supra note 125, at 9.
127. Id.
128. Jack Dorsey, U.S. To Challenge Sea Limits, LEDGER STAR, Aug. 7, 1979, at Al;
U.S. WIll Challenge Coastal Sea Claims That Exceed Three Miles, N.Y. Ti.lrEs, Aug., 10,
1979, at Al.
129. According to the CINCLANT communication, all ships and aircraft ware required
to keep detailed records of such transits and overflights. Id
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* assertions of jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea.
* all claims of archipelagic states.
* certain baseline and historic bay or water claims on a case-by-case
basis, especially those of Argentina, Uruguay, Libya, the Philip-
pines, and Burma.1 30
U.S. forces were ordered to avoid operating in a manner which
might be construed as acquiescent to claims inconsistent with U.S.
maritime rights.131 For example, the memorandum noted that be-
cause the United States believed that the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea may not be subject to a requirement of
prior notification, such notification would not be given to a coastal
state before U.S. warships entered its territorial waters. 132 Indeed, the
memorandum added that in certain instances, U.S. forces must con-
sider going out of their way to contest a maritime claim. 133 However,
the CINCLANT memorandum noted that while the United States
must ensure that it is seen as unequivocally exercising its rights, it
must avoid any irrational disposition of force and not challenge claims
in an aggressive manner1 34
The Group of Coastal States at UNCLOS III expressed "surprise
and concern" with the announcement of the Freedom of Navigation
program. 35 The vice-chairman of the Group of Coastal States noted
in a letter to the president of the Conference that the policy was unac-
ceptable and contrary to international law. 36
In the view of the [G]roup of [Cloastal [S]tates, such a policy, which
in its essentials has been confirmed by officials of the United States
Government, is highly regrettable and unacceptable, being contrary
to customary international law, whereby a great majority of States
exercise full sovereignty in their territorial seas up to a limit of 12
nautical miles, subject to the right of innocent passage. That policy
130. Id. at Al, A4.
131. Id. at Al.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. At the time, specific instructions went out to challenge the claims of Argentina,
Burma, Libya, the Philippines and Uruguay. Neither the Soviet Union nor China were
specifically targeted at the time although they both asserted excessive maritime claims.
Interestingly, at the time of the announcement, the U.S. destroyers Caron and Farragut
were conducting a "show the flag" cruise through the Black Sea. U.S. Will Challenge
Coastal Sea Claims That Exceed Three Miles, supra note 128, at Al; Soviet, in 2 Incidents,
Takes U.S. Torpedo and Baits Ships, N.Y. Tiriws, Aug. 11, 1979, at A4.
135. The Coastal States Group consisted of 76 coastal states and included both devel-
oped and developing countries. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982:
A Commentary 70-71 (Myron Nordquist ed. 1993).
136. U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/90 (1979).
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is also inconsistent with the prevailing understanding at the United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea which has recognized the
validity of such a practice. 137
Similarly, the Foreign Ministers of Chile, Columbia, Ecuador and
Peru declared that they did not agree with the manifestations of the
FON program which was "seemingly based on aggressive inten-
tions."'138 They added "that anyone seeking to trespass on the mari-
time zones where they exercise their sovereignty and jurisdiction
rightfully, peacefully and without prejudice to the freedom of commu-
nication would be answerable for any violation of those rights. 139
Angola, Argentina, Brazil, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
the Philippines, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam also made
statements criticizing the U.S. program.4 0
In defending the FON program at the UNCLOS III negotiations,
the U.S. delegation noted that the program was intended merely to
give consistent and non-provocative application to the U.S. view of
international law-that so long as there was no universal acceptance
of some clear definition of the territorial sea, the United States was
bound to assert its own view.14 1 According to Ambassador Richard-
137. Id. The letter added that:
[t]he group has taken note of the clarification which was later made by officials of
the United States Government to the effect that there has been no order to chal-
lenge in an aggressive way the claims of other nations. However, the group con-
siders the statement that the regime of high seas commences beyond three miles
is clearly an anachronism.
Id.
138. U.N. Doc. AICONF.6285 (1979).
139. Id.
140. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/StR 118 (1979). The Soviet representative noted that the
Group of Coastal States was justified in its anxiety. At the same time, the Soviets ex-
pressed concern at the attempts to justify the 200-mile limit. The Angolan delegation sup-
ported the coastal states' position by saying that it was unacceptable that any state should
take unilateral action which could prejudice the outcome of the Conference. The
Vietnamese delegate noted that the U.S. program constituted both a violation of interna-
tional law and practice and an attack on the sovereignty of the coastal state. In fact, Viet-
nam promised to take appropriate measures to protect its full sovereignty over the
territorial sea, continental shelf and other maritime zones under its jurisdiction. Id.
141. Following the disclosure of the FON program, State Department and Pentagon
officials revealed that the United States had not conducted assertive maritime maneuvers
for several years so as not to upset the UNCLOS III negotiations. They also noted that the
United States established the Freedom of Navigation program because operational pro-
tests involving ships and aircraft are considered far more effective than diplomatic protests.
U.S. Will Challenge Coastal Sea Claims That Exceed Three Miles, supra note 12.3, at Al;
Elliot Richardson, Power, Mobiliy, and the Law of the Sea, 58 FoREIGN AsF. 902 (1930).
In 1985, the U.S. government decided not to publicize FON operations because senior
officials felt that such action could result in political controversy. This decision %ias re-
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son, "[a]ctivities in the oceans by the United States are fully keeping
with its long-standing policy and with international law, which recog-
nizes that rights which are not consistently maintained will ultimately
be lost."' 42 In 1980, Ambassador Richardson noted that the disclo-
sure of the program served as an abrupt reminder of why UNCLOS
III had been convened in the first place:
[The program has been developed in order to challenge] rapidly ex-
panding coastal state claims over ocean space and the impact of
these on traditional freedoms of maritime travel and the movement
of military and peacekeeping forces. In effect, the old alliance
among peacekeeping powers, the global peacetime mobility of mili-
tary forces, and a universal system of ocean law has been disinte-
grating. Its renewal, under terms appropriate to the present,
remains an essential task of the Conference, and one in which not
only the United States but all nations have a major stake. 143
The importance of the FON program in securing U.S. maritime
rights increased significantly when the Reagan Administration an-
nounced that the United States would not sign the 1982 LOS Conven-
tion. According to the State Department, "[t]he U.S. decision not to
become a party to the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention makes all
the more necessary a clear assertion of our rights and a revitalized and
more effective navigation and overflight program."'1 Therefore,
"[t]he essential objective of the USG [United States Government]
navigation program was and remains to exercise our rights in the face
of excessive maritime claims in order to protect, through such prac-
tice, the international legal principles upon which our navigation and
overflight rights and freedoms are based.' 45 In a National Security
Directive, President Reagan announced that U.S. interests were to be
protected against the following categories of excessive maritime
claims:
1. Historic bay or historic water claims that are not recognized by
the United States.
versed in 1988. See Action Memorandum from H. Allen Holmes to the Secretary of State
(Feb. 4, 1988) (declassified Aug. 10, 1989).
142. U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/92 (October 1, 1979). In announcing the program, Presi-
dent Carter commented that "[d]ue to its preeminent position, the United States feels com-
pelled actively to protect its rights from unlawful encroachment by coastal states." John
Rolph, Freedom of Navigation and the Black Sea Bumping Incident How Innocent Must
Innocent Passage Be?, 135 Mi. L. Rnv. 137, 147 (1992).
143. Richardson, Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea, supra note 141, at 903.
144. Department of State Memorandum (Feb. 9, 1983) (declassified Oct. 6, 1992).
145. Id.
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2. Continental territorial sea baseline claims that are not drawn in
conformance with the [1982] LOS Convention.
3. Territorial seas claims exceeding three miles but not exceeding
twelve miles in breadth that contain special requirements for entry
or overlap straits used for international navigation.
4. Territorial seas claims in excess of twelve miles.
5. Other claims to jurisdiction over maritime areas in excess of
twelve miles, such as exclusive economic zones or security zones,
which purport to restrict non-resource related high seas freedoms.
6. Archipelagic claims that are not in conformance with the LOS
Convention.'
46
While the United States claimed that the navigational provisions
in the Convention codified customary international law, a number of
states challenged this assertion.147 The Group of 77 argued that the
navigational provisions of the Convention did not codify customary
international law but rather created new international law. 14s There-
fore, only signatories to the Convention could benefit from its provi-
sions.149 Similarly, Ambassador Tommy Koh, the second President of
UNCLOS Ill, argued that the Convention did not codify customary
law or reflect existing international practice.15 0 In response, Reagan
Administration officials noted that "[t]he convention does not so
much create positive law in the nonseabed areas as simply incorporate
existing law that will continue to be applicable to all states, not be-
cause of the treaty but because of the customary law underlying the
treaty."15 ' Indeed, "the United States maintains that there exists an
146. National Security Decision Directive No. 72, supra note 63, at 1-2.
147. ScimIT, supra note 103, at 264-74. See generally David Larson, Conventtona,
Customary and Consensual Law in the United Nations Convention on te Law of the Sea,
25 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 75 (1994); Moscow S.mwosiu!.m ON4 mE Lw OF THE SEA 19-
30 (Thomas Clingan, Jr. & Anatoly L Kolodkin eds., 19S); THE UNrrFD STATEAS Wrn.
ouT THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY. OPror-uNmrrs AND COSTS (Laurence Juda ed.,
1983).
148. The Group of 77 consisted of approximately 120 developing countries. UrNiTED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A CoMMihENTARY, supra note 135,
at 81-82.
149. U.N. Press Release SEA/MBI14 (Dec. 10. 1982); G.A. Res. 59, U.N. GAOR, 3Sth
Sess., Supp. No. 47, at 48, U.N. Doe. No. A/38159 (1983). See generally Luke Lee, The Law
of the Sea Convention and Third States, 77 Am. J. IN'rL L. 541 (1933).
150. Tommy Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, in UNrrED NATIONS, TE Lv.v OF Tm
SEA: OFFICIAL TEXT OF Tm UNrrED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE L,%% OF THE SEA
wrrm ANxEs AND INDF-x xxiv-vxv (1983).
151. Malone, supra note 68, at 60. In 1986, the International Court of Justic noted in
the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, that
portions of the 1982 LOS Convention "codify customary international law." Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 111 (June 27).
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international law of the sea totally independent of the Law of the Sea
Convention."' 52 Another argument held that the 1982 LOS Conven-
tion represented "an indivisible package of interrelated compromises
in which third states cannot generally find support for the exercise of
customary rights.' 53 The Reagan Administration responded that the
package theory lacked legal foundation and that "[a]bsent a peremp-
tory norm to the contrary, customary rights of sovereign states remain
inviolate and cannot otherwise be denied."154
The importance of the Freedom of Navigation program was reit-
erated by U.S. government officials throughout the Reagan Adminis-
tration. 55 For example, Secretary of State George Shultz remarked
that the State Department places a high priority on thoroughly articu-
lated and timely expressions of U.S. policy regarding excessive mari-
time claims: "We shall, therefore, continue to protest such claims,
laying particular emphasis on impermissible declarations made in con-
152. Malone, supra note 68, at 61. For these reasons, Secretary Malone noted that it is
incorrect "to argue that only parties to the LOS Convention enjoy customary international
legal rights of longstanding status." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FREEDOM AND OPPORTUNITY,
supra note 68, at 2-3. Similarly, in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Arms
Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs Theodore Kronmiller stated that "[t]he exercise
by the United States of rights and freedoms under international law can be limited only
with our consent. This point holds true with regard both to our right to mine the seabed
and to our right to navigate under, on and over the world's oceans, including international
straits." Law of the Sea Negotiations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control,
Oceans, International Operations and Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982).
153. Hugo Caminos & Michael Molitor, Progressive Development of International Law
and the Package Deal, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 871, 885 (1985). As Ambassador Tommy Koh
noted at the conclusion of the signature session at UNCLOS III:
The second theme which emerged from the statements is that the provisions
of the Convention are closely interrelated and form an integral package. Thus it
is not possible for a State to pick what it likes and to disregard what it does not
like. It was also said that rights and obligations go hand in hand and it is not
permissible to claim rights under the Convention without being willing to shoul-
der the corresponding obligations.
Although the Convention consists of a series of compromises, they form an
integral whole. This is why the Convention does not provide for reservations. It
is therefore not possible for States to pick what they like and disregard what they
do not like. In international law, as in domestic law, rights and duties go hand in
hand. It is therefore legally impermissible to claim rights under the Convention
without being willing to assume the correlative duties.
Koh, supra note 150, at xxxiv-xxxvi.
154. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FREEDOM AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 68, at 3. See also
Bruce Harlow, Correspondence, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1037 (1985).
155. See also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FREEDOM AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 68, pas-
sim; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 73, passim.
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junction with ratification of that Convention, unacceptable declara-
tions made upon signing of it, and other excessive claims that
significantly impair our maritime mobility." 15 6 Similarly, Assistant
Secretary of State John Negroponte argued that:
The exercise of rights-the freedom to navigate on the world's
oceans-is not meant to be a provocative act. Rather, in the frame-
work of customary international law, it is a legitimate, peaceful as-
sertion of a legal position and nothing more. If the United States
and other maritime states do not assert international rights in the
face of claims by others that do not conform with the present status
of the law, they will be said to acquiesce in those claims to their
disadvantage. What is particularly difficult in this situation is to un-
derstand that the more aggressive and unreasonable and provoca-
tive and threatening a claim may be, the more important it is to
exercise one's rights in the face of the claim. The world community
can't allow itself to be coerced-coerced into lethargy in the protec-
tion of the freedom of the seas.157
Since its formation in 1979, the FON program has been an inte-
gral part of U.S. maritime policy. Indeed, the Defense Department
noted that once the 1982 LOS Convention enters into force, "the U.S.
should continue to protest excessive maritime claims, and exercise
routinely and on a global scale, U.S. navigational, overflight, and
other defense-related rights and duties" -sS
C. Freedom of Navigation Challenges
The Freedom of Navigation program combines diplomatic and
operational challenges to contest objectionable claims. 119 The De-
partments of State and Defense are jointly responsible for the pro-
gram and operations are conducted pursuant to careful interagency
156. Correspondence from Secretary of State George Shultz to Secretary of Dfens
Caspar Weinberger (Apr. 8, 1985) (declassified Nov. 20, 19S9) (on file %ith author).
157. John D. Negroponte, Address before the Law of the Sea Institute (July 21, 19,6).
in BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURREtT POL", No. 855, WHO
Wn.L PROTECT FREEDOM OF THE SEAs? 3 (19S6).
158. U.S. DEP'T OF DE'ENSE, OcEAN Potac REVIEw, supra note 22, at 19,
159. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, GIST: U.S. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATiON Pors ow.m, supra
note 21, passim; Galdorisi, supra note 22, at 79-S0; Rolph, supra note 142, at 146.52. Ac-
cording to National Security Decision Directive Number 265, "[w]here possible, wa should
strive for a balanced challenge program which contests the excessive claims or illegal re-
gimes of allied or friendly states, inimical powers, and neutral states alike. [In addition],
[s]pecial emphasis should also be given to challenging claims which have no record of prior
challenge." National Security Decision Directive No. 265 at 4 (Mar. 16, 19S7) (declassified
Aug. 10, 1992).
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review. According to the State Department, "[t]he program was de-
veloped with the understanding that transits would become routine.
Although diplomatic protests can be anticipated from some countries
not adhering to the LOS Convention, reactions are not expected to be
significant.' 160
1. Diplomatic Protests
Under the FON program, the United States undertakes diplo-
matic action at several levels to preserve its rights under international
law. It conducts bilateral consultations with many coastal states,
stressing the need for all states to adhere to the rules and practices
reflected in the 1982 LOS Convention. 6' When appropriate, the
State Department files a formal diplomatic protest addressing specific
maritime claims. 62 Since the FON program was established in 1979,
the United States has presented diplomatic protests to more than 110
excessive maritime claims. 63 In addition, the FON program involves
extensive multilateral efforts designed to maximize and affirm U.S.
navigational rights.
In 1989, the Department of State initiated a formal review of the
Freedom of Navigation program. 64 The review determined that vari-
ous gaps existed in the implementation of the program. Specifically, it
revealed that formal written objections had not been presented to ap-
proximately thirty excessive claims.' 65 Thereafter, the State Depart-
ment notified American embassies around the world that they must
present official objections to excessive maritime claims. The following
excerpt, taken from a telegram sent by the State Department to the
American Embassy in Bucharest, Romania, is characteristic of the
purpose of these notices:
USG [United States Government] believes that GOR's [Govern-
ment of Romania's] claim exceeds the limits of international law of
160. Department of State Memorandum (Apr. 21, 1986) (declassified Oct. 6, 1992).
161. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Lims IN THE SEAS, supra note 20, at 1.
162. These diplomatic protests include formal notes, notes verbale, and aides memoire.
ROACH & SMrrH, supra note 20, at 4.
163. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LIMrrs IN THE SEAs, supra note 20, at 1.
164. The study identified twenty states that claim a territorial sea in excess of twelve
nautical miles, seventeen states that claim the right to establish some type of security zone
beyond the territorial sea affecting the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight,
thirty-one states that claim excessive baselines, and five states that claim a right to require
prior notice or permission for the innocent passage of nuclear powered warships. U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, LImIrrs IN THE SEA, supra note 20, passim.
165. Id.
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the sea. To avoid acquiescence and to influence international law of
the sea development along acceptable lines, we object to such
claims. This should not be viewed as a singling out of the GOR for
criticism; post [the American Embassy] may assure GOR that such
action is part of a current global review of excessive maritime claims
and comports with longstanding USG practice of formally pro-
testing them.166
The following section reviews two diplomatic protests that were
filed by the United States in 1989 against Finland and Haiti. 67 They
exemplify the manner in which the United States responds diplomati-
cally under the FON program.
a. Finland
On June 2,1989, the American Embassy in Helsinki, Finland was
ordered to deliver a note protesting Finland's decree of January 1,
1981, which established certain restrictions on the exercise of innocent
passage by warships and non-commercial government ships entering
Finnish territorial waters.16s In particular, the United States pro-
tested: (1) the assertion that warships and non-commercial govern-
ment vessels must notify Finland prior to transiting its territorial sea;
(2) the prohibition of innocent passage through fortified areas or
other declared areas of the Finnish territorial sea to be of military
importance; (3) the prohibition of the arrival in such areas except be-
tween sunrise and sunset; and (4) the requirement to use pilot service
and public sea lanes as regulated when navigating in Finnish territorial
waters.
169
First, the U.S. protest note stated that under customary interna-
tional law, as codified by the 1982 LOS Convention, the right of inno-
cent passage through the territorial sea may be exercised by all ships,
regardless of type or cargo, and may not be subject to a requirement
of prior notification to the coastal state.170 According to the protest
note, the United States viewed the right of innocent passage as one of
166. Telegram from the Secretary of State, Washington D.C. to American Embassy,
Bucharest, Romania (July 11, 1989) (declassified Dec. 4, 19S9).
167. For a description of various U.S. diplomatic challenges, see ROACH & SMrrff,
supra note 20, passim.
168. Telegram from the Secretary of State, Washington D.C. to American Embassy,
Helsinki, Finland (June 2, 1989) (declassified Dec. 4, 19S9) [hereinafter Telegram from
Secretary of State to Finland]. See also ROACH & S.IrH, supra note 20, at 147-41.
169. Telegram from Secretary of State to Finland, supra note 168, at 66-67 (2-3).
170. Id at 66.
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the most fundamental maritime rights.'71 Thus, U.S. government pol-
icy is to neither recognize nor respect in practice any nation's claim
that vessels of any type must obtain permission, or provide prior noti-
fication, in order to conduct innocent passage through a territorial sea.
Second, the United States argued that Finnish claims to a right to
deny innocent passage through fortified areas or other areas declared
to be of military importance, as well as claims to limit arrival of gov-
ernment vessels in such areas only to the time between sunrise and
sunset, were contrary to provisions in the 1982 LOS Convention. 72
The United States asserted that the generally recognized provisions
for temporary suspension of innocent passage set out in the 1982 LOS
Convention adequately protected Finnish national security
interests. 73
Third, the United States sought assurances that the provisions re-
garding public sea lanes in the Finnish territorial sea applied only to
those sea lanes established as necessary for the safety of navigation.174
According to the protest note, customary international law, as re-
flected in article 22 of the 1982 LOS Convention, permits a coastal
state to establish sea lanes in its territorial sea where needed for the
safety of navigation, after taking into account the recommendations of
the competent international organization (i.e., the International Mari-
time Organization), any channels customarily used for international
navigation, the special characteristics of particular ships and channels,
and the density of the traffic.' 75 Evidently, the United States wanted
to ascertain the rationale and purpose of the Finnish sea lane
restrictions.
Finally, the United States argued that no authority exists in inter-
national law requiring compulsory pilotage of vessels engaged in inno-
cent passage through the territorial sea. 76 While the United States
had no objection to Finland offering pilotage services to U.S. warships
and other government ships, the United States maintained that such
services could be accepted or declined at the discretion of the flag
state.' 7
7
171. Id at 68.
172. Id at 69. For a discussion of maritime security zones, see Frederick Leiner, Mari-
time Security Zones: Prohibited Yet Perpetuated, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 967 (1984).
173. Telegram from Secretary of State to Finland, supra note 168, at 66.
174. Id at 67.
175. Id'at 70.
176. Id at 69.
177. Id.
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In response, the Finnish government stated that "[a]ccording to
the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone of 29 April 1958 to which Finland is a party, it is within the
sovereign right of a state to regulate internally the exercise of inno-
cent passage of warships.' ' 7-s Thus, Finland would continue to apply
its regime on innocent passage. It added, however, that the regime
would be reconsidered if changes "emerge in the international regime
on innocent passage in the territorial sea."' 79
b. Haiti
On July 20,1989, the American Embassy in Port Au Prince, Haiti
was ordered to deliver a note protesting Haiti's decisions: (1) to pro-
hibit the entry into its territorial sea and exclusive economic zone of
any vessel transporting hazardous waste; and (2) to declare jurisdic-
tion in its contiguous zone for the protection of its securityY -:
First, the United States protested Haiti's note verbale-sent in the
names of the Ministry of the Interior, Decentralization, and the Gen-
eral Police Force and the Civil Service and communicated to the
United Nations by a letter dated February 29, 198-which sought to
prohibit entry into the territorial sea or the exclusive economic zone
of Haiti, as well as into Haitian ports, of any vessel transporting waste,
refuse, residues, or any other materials likely to endanger the health
of the country's population and to pollute the marine, air, and land
environment. 81 The U.S. protest note stated that the 1982 LOS Con-
vention did not recognize the right of a coastal state to prohibit the
passage of ships transporting hazardous waste through a coastal state's
territorial sea or exclusive economic zone.', The United States main-
178. Telegram from the Secretary of State, Washington D.C. to American Embassy,
Helsinki, Finland (July 14, 19S9).
179. Id.
180. Telegram from Department of State, Washington D.C., to American Embassy,
Port Au Prince, Haiti (June 18, 1989) (declassified June 5, 1990) [hereinafter Telegram
from Department of State to Haiti]. This communication noted that the Haitian regula-
tions exceeded the limits of international law.
To avoid acquiescence and to influence development of international law of the
sea along acceptable lines, we object to such claims. This should not be viewed as
singling out the GOH [Government of Haiti] for criticism; [the diplomatic] post
may assure GOH that such action is part of a current global review of excessive
maritime claims and comports with longstanding USG [United States Govern-
ment] practice of formally protesting them.
Id.
181. Id. at 9.
182. Id at 2.
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tained that while customary international law affords coastal states the
right to enact laws and regulations in the interest of preserving the
environment, that legislation had to conform to the 1982 LOS Con-
vention. 18 3 The note added that the United States was prepared to
accept the right of the coastal state to monitor the transit of hazardous
materials through its internal waters.'84 However, the United States
would not accept any limitations on the freedom of navigation
through the territorial sea.181
The United States also protested Haiti's decree on June 12, 1977,
which sought to assert jurisdiction in the contiguous zone for the pro-
tection of its security.'86 The protest note stated that customary inter-
national law, as reflected in the 1982 LOS Convention, did not
recognize the right of coastal states to assert jurisdiction for security
purposes in peacetime that would restrict the exercise of the high seas
freedoms of navigation and overflight beyond the territorial sea.s 7
According to article 33 of the LOS Convention, a coastal state is per-
mitted to exercise, in a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, the con-
trol necessary to prevent the infringement only of its customs, fiscal,
immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or
territorial sea. 88 However, international law does not recognize the
right of coastal states to assert powers or rights for security reasons
beyond these purposes. Accordingly, the U.S. did not accept the
peacetime validity of any claimed security zone seaward of the territo-
rial sea, including an area contiguous to the territorial sea.
183. Id. at 4. At the same time, the United States expressed support for efforts to cre-
ate an environmentally sound regime for the transboundary movement of hazardous waste.
Id Thus, the United States strongly supported the recently concluded Basel Convention
on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, which Haiti had already signed,
and which the United States was then reviewing. Id.
The Basel Convention includes a notice and consent regime for the transit of hazard-
ous waste through a party's land territory and internal waters. Basel Convention on the
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/IG.80/3 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Conven-
tion]. However, a savings clause, article 4(12), was included for the express purpose of
precluding the argument that the Basel Convention parties consented to a regime that
would permit the imposition of a notice and consent regime for the transit of hazardous
waste through a coastal state's territorial sea and exclusive economic zone.
184. Telegram from Department of State to Haiti, supra note 180, at 4.
185. Id. at 4-5.
186. Id at 5.
187. Id.
188. LOS Convention, supra note 50, art. 33. See also Rose Varghese, Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone: Concept and Development, 9 CocHIN U. L. REv. 436 (1985).
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Finally, the United States reasserted its protest of Haiti's drawing
of excessive straight baselines along its coast and the drawing of a
closing line across the Gulf of Gonave, thereby claiming the Gulf as
internal waters of Haiti.189 The U.S. argued that straight baselines are
only permitted in exceptional circumstances. Under the 1982 LOS
Convention, a specific formula exists for determining the closing line
across the mouth of a bay or gulf. Since the Gulf of Gonave did not
meet these criteria, it could not be considered internal waters.
2. Operational Protests
In conjunction with diplomatic action, the Defense Department
conducts operational challenges to protest objectionable claims. Ac-
cording to the State Department, operational assertions tangibly man-
ifest the U.S. determination not to acquiesce in excessive claims to
maritime jurisdiction by other countries. 19 Operational challenges
are conducted under strict regulation, and peacetime rules of engage-
ment are applicable throughout FON operations. Naval and air units
must follow strict guidelines if they are challenged during FON opera-
tions.' 91 In particularly sensitive challenges, approval must be re-
189. Telegram from Department of State to Haiti, supra note ISO. at 7. 'The United
States has operationally protested Haiti's drawing of excessive straight baselines for sev-
eral years. For example, Freedom of Navigation challenges were conducted by the U.S.S.
Yosemite on February 15, 1986, the U.S.S. W.V. Pratt on March 16. 19S6, and the U.S.S.
Manitowac on May 10, 1987. Naval Messages, Dep't of Navy, Messages from CIN-
CLANTFLT (Apr. 1, 1986 & Oct. 27, 1987) (declassified June 30, 19S9).
190. U.S. DE,'T oF STATE, Lufrrs N Tm SExs, supra note 20. at 1.
191. For example, the following message was sent by CINCUSNAVEUR to the Com-
mander of the Sixth Fleet in preparation for a series of Freedom of Navigation challenges
in 1985:
1. This message provides guidance for ships and aircraft challenging excessive
maritime claims under the navigation and overflight program ....
2. Should U.S. ships and aircraft be questioned concerning their intention or justi-
fication for their actions during such operations, [the] following responses should
be made:
A. Territorial sea greater than 12 nm [nautical miles] (Challenge beyond 12
nm):
1. Ships: "I am operating in international waters."
2. Aircraft: "I am operating in international airspace above the high
seas."
B. Territorial sea greater than 12 rm (Challenge between 3 nm and 12 nm):
1. Ships: "I am engaging in innocent passage."
2. Aircraft: Not applicable.
C. Territorial sea between 3 nm and 12 nm with warship notificationrauthori.
zation regime:
1. Ships: "I am engaged in innocent passage." If challenging unit re-
sponds that prior permission not obtained for innocent passage ships
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ceived from the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the President.192 Since 1945,
the U.S. has operationally protested the objectionable claims of over
forty states at the rate of approximately thirty to forty per year.19 3
For obvious reasons, operational challenges create the potential
for violent conflicts. 194 Since its foundation in 1979, FON exercises
have resulted in numerous military confrontations between U.S.
forces and foreign naval and air units. For example:
* In August 1979, Soviet aircraft staged more than 30 mock missile
attacks against the destroyers U.S.S. Caron and U.S.S. Farragut as
they conducted Freedom of Navigation exercises in the Black Sea.
According to Pentagon officials, the Soviets sent out a variety of
aircraft, including the Backfire bomber, to join reconnaissance
planes in tracking the U.S. destroyers after they sailed into the
Black Sea.195
• On August 19, 1981, two Libyan SU-22 fighters attacked two U.S.
F-14s during a previously announced U.S. naval maneuver and mis-
sile exercise conducted by elements of the Sixth Fleet operating
within the Gulf of Sidra and approximately 60 nautical miles from
the Libyan coast.1 96
* On February 18, 1984, the destroyer U.S.S. David Ray was con-
ducting FON operations in the Black Sea near Novorossiysk,
U.S.S.R., when Soviet aircraft fired cannon rounds into the ship's
wake and a Soviet helicopter swooped within 30 feet of the deck
should respond "International law permits all ships of all nations to exer-
cise innocent passage without prior notification or authorization."
D. Security Zones: Same response as for territorial sea depending on
whether challenging unit is inside or outside 12 nm.
E. Airspace claim greater than territorial sea claim:
1. Ships: Not applicable
2. Aircraft: "I am operating aircraft in international airspace above the
high seas."
Message from Commander United States Naval Forces, Europe to Commander Sixth Fleet
(Mar. 12, 1986) (declassified Aug. 7, 1989).
192. Defense Department Briefing Regarding Collision in Black Sea, Feb. 12,1988, at 2
(on file with author).
193. ROACH & Shir, supra note 20, at 4.
194. "Within DOD [Department of Defense], there is also a sober appreciation that the
literal testing of the waters required by a FON strategy involves the risk of confrontation
and escalation." William Arkin, Spying in the Black Sea, BuLL. OF THE AToMic SCIEN.
's-r, May 1, 1988, at 5.
195. U.S. Ships Report Soviet Mock Attack, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1979, at AS.
196. Commander Dennis Neutze, The Gulf of Sidra Incident: A Legal Perspective, 108
NAVAL INST. PROC. 26-31 (1982). See generally Steven Ratner, The Gulf of Sidra Incident
of 1981: A Study of the Lawfulness of Peacetime Aerial Engagements, 10 YAIE J. INT'L L.
59 (1984); John Spinnato, Historic and Vital Bays: An Analysis of Libya's Claim to the Gulf
of Sidra, 13 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 65 (1983).
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while taking photographs of the destroyer. According to U.S. offi-
cials, the Soviet action was considered "a violation of the spirit of
the Incidents at Sea Agreement.' 9 7
On March 26, 1986, during Freedom of Navigation exercises in
the Gulf of Sidra, Libyan missile installations fired on aircraft pro-
viding combat air patrol. In response, aircraft from the U.S.S.
America and the U.S.S. Saratoga attacked and destroyed several
Libyan patrol boats and disabled the SA-5 Square Pair radar at
Surt.198
* On March 16, 1987, the U.S.S. Arkansas, a nuclear-powered
guided missile cruiser, entered Avacha Bay on the Kamchatka Pe-
ninsula and approached Petropavlovsk, a sensitive Soviet submarine
port and naval base. At the time, the Arkansas was conducting
Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations. The approach of the Ar-
kansas resulted in an immediate Soviet response. 1 9
Despite its propensity for conflict, the Freedom of Navigation
program has led to the successful resolution of several maritime con-
flicts. Indeed, FON operations against the Soviet Union are perhaps
the most successful example of the effectiveness of the Freedom of
Navigation program.2°
a. The Black Sea
For many years, the United States and the Soviet Union heavily
disputed the right of U.S. warships to enter and conduct naval opera-
tions in the Black Sea.20' According to the Pentagon, the United
States has conducted maritime operations in the Black Sea since 1960,
and by the 1980s, American warships were passing through the Turk-
ish straits from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea two or three
197. Rick Atkinson, High Seas Diplomacy Continuing, VAsm Posy, July 27, 1984, at
Al.
198. Lieutenant Commander Robert Stumpf, Air War with Libya, 116 NAvAL INb.
PRoc. 42-48 (1986). See also Roger Haerr, The Gulf of Sidra, 24 S.q DIEGo L. REv. 751
(1987).
199. Document received from Commander Third Fleet (declassified June 27,19S9) (on
file with author); Jeff Berliner, Soviets, U.S. Navy Ship in Tense Confrontation. UPI, Aug.
16, 1987.
200. Aceves, supra note 20, at 59.
201. See generally William Butler, Innocent Passage and the 1932 Convention: The In.
fluence of Soviet Law and Policy, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 331 (1957); Horace Robertson, Inter-
national Straits, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 4 (1980); Rolph, supra note 142, passum; William
Schachte, Jr. and J. Peter Bernhardt, International Straits and Naviational Freedoms, 33
VA. J. h'L L. 527 (1993).
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times a year to "show the flag" and to exercise the right of innocent
passage in the territorial seas of littoral states.202
The presence of U.S. warships in the Black Sea served three pur-
poses. First, the United States sent warships through the Turkish
straits to uphold its rights under the 1936 Montreux Convention.20 3
According to a U.S. government official, "[t]he Dardanelles and the
Bosphorus form an international waterway. Passage is covered by the
1936 Montreux Convention. If you don't periodically reaffirm your
rights you find that they're hard to revive. ' 20 4 Second, U.S. opera-
tions in the Black Sea demonstrated that the waters outside the terri-
torial sea are international waters, where every state enjoys the high
seas freedoms of navigation and overflight. Third, the U.S. conducted
Freedom of Navigation exercises in Soviet territorial waters in the
Black Sea to affirm the right of innocent passage.
The Soviet Union considered the U.S. operations in the Black
Sea unacceptable.205 Thus, the Soviets routinely dispatched naval ves-
sels and aircraft to monitor U.S. warships. Specifically, the Soviets
criticized the U.S. operations on three grounds. First, the Soviets
claimed that the American maneuvers violated the Montreux Conven-
tion because the antisubmarine rocket (ASROC) caliber of the U.S.
destroyers exceeded the 203 mm. Convention limit.2°6 Second, the
Soviets criticized the maneuvers as both provocative and dangerous
202. Message from the Office of Information, Department of the Navy to the Com-
mander in Chief, Naval Forces, Europe (Mar. 19, 1986). The United States has also con-
ducted Freedom of Navigation operations in the Black Sea against Romania and Bulgaria,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, SPOT INTELLIGENCF
REPORT, BLACK SEA: SOVIETS SHOULDER U.S. SHIPS IN SOVIET TERRITORIAL WATERS
OFF COAST OF CRI~mA, Feb. 12, 1988, at 2.
203. The Montreux Convention was signed in 1936 and concerns the regulation of
transit through the Turkish straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. NATOALINO
RONzrrIT, THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 435-82 (1988). The Montreux Convention
granted exclusive Turkish sovereignty over the straits. It granted complete freedom of
transit and navigation to merchant vessels. Id. However, the Convention significantly re-
stricted transit by warships. Id. See generally Gerald Fitzmaurice, Note, The Straits Con-
vention of Montreux, 1936, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 186 (1937).
204. Benjamin Welles, While Keeping the Flag Flying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1968, at 3E,
205. According to Igor Belyayev of Pravda, "[t]he waters of the Black Sea are joined
with the Mediterranean through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The striving of the So-
viet Union to protect its vital state interests in the region is completely natural and lawful."
Igor Belyayev, International Review, PRAVDA, Dec. 7, 1968. Thus, the Soviets dispatched
their naval vessels and aircraft in order to shadow and harass U.S. ships from the time they
enter the Black Sea until they depart. Id.; Commander Richard Ackley, The Soviet Navy's
Role in Foreign Policy, 2 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 48, 55 (1972).
206. Ackley, supra note 205, at 55-56. According to the United States, the ASROC is
not a gun, and is thereby not covered by the Convention. Id&
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and asserted that there was no justification for the maintenance by the
United States of a presence in the Black Sea?0 7 In 1968, Izvestya
commentator A. Sharifov noted that "[t]he provocative visit by Amer-
ican ships to the Black Sea is aimed at troubling the clear waters of
the good neighbor relations of the Black Sea countries."2c'' In the
1980s, the Soviets criticized Freedom of Navigation exercises in the
Black Sea as an attempt to undermine improving Soviet-American re-
lations.2 9 Third, the Soviet Union protested U.S. operations in Soviet
territorial waters because they violated Soviet maritime regulations.210
In 1983, the Soviet Union enacted the Rules for Navigation and So-
journ of Foreign Warships in the Territorial Waters and Internal Wa-
ters and Ports of the U.S.S.R. 11 The Rules limited the operation of
foreign warships through the territorial waters of the Soviet Union.
Specifically, the Soviet regulations stated that innocent passage
through Soviet territorial waters was permitted only along routes ordi-
narily used for international navigation.1 2 The Rules set out "traffic
separation schemes" through which warships could travel in the Baltic
Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Sea of Japan.213 There were no
routes available for innocent passage in the Black Sea? 14
Freedom of Navigation operations in the Black Sea resulted in
numerous confrontations between U.S. and Soviet forces?15 Indeed,
Soviet reaction to the U.S. presence in the Black Sea gradually devel-
oped from one of diplomatic protest to armed response. This conflict
culminated in February 1988 when the U.S.S. Yorktown and Caron
were struck by Soviet warships while conducting Freedom of Naviga-
207. Id. at 56.
208. A. Sharifov, Provocateurs at Sea, IzEs'rTIA, Dec. 8, 196S.
209. Philip Taubman, Soviet Says It Hopes "Provocation" by U.S. at Sea Won't Hurt
Talks, N.Y. Tmms, Feb. 14, 1988, at 19.
210. Joseph Darby, The Soviet Doctrine of the Closed Sea, 23 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 635
(1986).
211. The Rules were approved by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers on April 23, 193.
Rules for Navigation and Sojourn of Foreign Warships in the Territorial and Internal Waters
and Ports of the U.S.S.R., 28 LL.M. 1715 (1985). See also Lieutenant Commander Ronald
Neubauer, The Right of Innocent Passage for Warships in the Territorial Sea. A Response to
the Soviet Union, 1 NAVAL WNAr REv. 49, 52 (1988).
212. Rules for Navigation and Sojourn of Foreign Warships in the Territorial and Inter-
nal Waters and Ports of the U.S.S.R., supra note 211, 28 LL.M. at 1715.
213. Id.
214. As noted by one Soviet commentator, "[i]n short, one may enter [through the
traffic separation schemes] 'without knocking' there. In any other place, as not only good
manners but also international norms suggest, one should knock first." Gorokhov, What
Business Do They Have Off Our Coast?, PRAVDA, Feb. 14, 19&5, at 4.
215. See generally Arkin, supra note 194, at 5.
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tion operations in Soviet territorial waters south of the Crimean pe-
ninsula in the Black Sea.216
Following the February 1988 incident, the Soviet Union expressed
a strong desire to reach some form of accommodation with the United
States on the issue of innocent passage in Soviet territorial waters.217
Indeed, the State Department noted "that the Soviets entered into a
serious effort to reconcile our divergent views of the right of innocent
passage only after the February 1988 Black Sea FON operation."21 3
Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci suggested that the United States
and the Soviet Union should try to set better guidelines for reducing
dangerous incidents such as the confrontation in the Black Sea. 19
As a result, the United States and Soviet Union held a series of
bilateral consultations in an attempt to resolve the issues raised by the
bumping incident. The negotiations involved two distinct matters: (1)
the avoidance of dangerous military activities; and (2) the right of in-
nocent passage. This dialogue resulted in the signing of two bilateral
agreements in 1989: the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous
Military Activities and the Uniform Interpretation of Rules of Inter-
national Law Governing Innocent Passage.
On June 1, 1989, the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous
Military Activities (Agreement) was signed in Moscow by Admiral
Crowe and Colonel General Mikhail Moiseyev, newly appointed
Chief of the Soviet General Staff.30 According to the Agreement, the
parties were "guided by generally recognized principles and rules of
international law. '221 The document notes that both sides are con-
vinced of the need to prevent dangerous military activities and
thereby reduce the possibility of incidents arising between their armed
forces.' The Agreement states that the parties "shall exercise great
216. Aceves, supra note 20, passim. See generally John Hitt, Oceans Law and Super-
power Relations: The Bumping of the Yorktown and the Caron in the Black Sea, 29 VA. 3.
INT'L L. 713 (1989); William Schachte, The Black Sea Challenge, 114 NAVAL INST. PROC.
62 (1988).
217. Action Memorandum to the Secretary of State (Sept. 5, 1989) (declassified June 5,
1990); Memorandum from Secretary of State to American Embassy, Moscow (Aug. 8,
1988) (declassified June 5, 1990).
218. Memorandum from Secretary of State to American Embassy, Moscow, supra note
217.
219. Charles Aldinger, No Change in Soviet Military Policy, Reuters, Mar. 15, 1988.
220. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous
Military Activities, June 1, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 877 (1989).
221. Id. at 879.
222. ld.
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caution and prudence while operating near the national territory of
the other Party."' ' 3 It allows the parties to designate "Special Caution
Areas" where military personnel must establish and maintain commu-
nications and undertake measures to prevent dangerous military activ-
ities.224 The Agreement also provides for the establishment of a Joint
Military Commission to ensure compliance with the Agreement and
consider ways to ensure a higher level of safety?
On September 23, 1989, Secretary of State James Baker and So-
viet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze signed the Uniform Inter-
pretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage
(Uniform Interpretation).2 6 The Uniform Interpretation provides a
common understanding between the parties concerning the right of
innocent passage as codified in the 1982 LOS Convention. First, it
acknowledges that "[t]he relevant rules of international law governing
innocent passage of ships in the territorial sea are stated in the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.' ' -7 It then pro-
vides that "[a]U ships, including warships, regardless of cargo, arma-
ment or means of propulsion, enjoy the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea in accordance with international law, for
which neither prior notification nor authorization is required. '"' S The
Uniform Interpretation recognizes that the coastal state may prescribe
sea lanes and traffic separation schemes only where necessary to pro-
tect the safety of navigation.229 Finally, the Uniform Interpretation
notes that "[w]ithout prejudice to the exercise of rights of coastal and
flag States, all differences which may arise regarding a particular case
of passage of ships through the territorial sea shall be settled through
diplomatic channels or other agreed means."' "O
On September 28, 1989, the State Department notified all U.S.
diplomatic posts that since Soviet border regulations had been
223. Id at 882.
224. Id at 883.
225. Id.
226. Joint Statement with Attached Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International
Law Governing Innocent Passage, Sept. 23, 19S9, U.S.-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1444
(1989) [hereinafter Uniform Interpretation].
227. Id. art. 1.
228. Id. art. 2. Article 3 of the Uniform Interpretation provides that "[alrticle 19 of the
Convention of 1982 sets out in paragraph 2 an exhaustive list of activities that would
render passage not innocent. A ship passing through the territorial sea that does not en-
gage in any of those activities is in innocent passage." Id art. 3.
229. Id "In areas where no such sea lanes or traffic separation schemes have been
prescribed, ships nevertheless enjoy the right of innocent passage." Id.
230. Id arL 8.
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brought into conformity with the 1982 LOS Convention, the U.S. gov-
ernment had assured the Soviet Union that the United States had no
reason to exercise its right of innocent passage under the Freedom of
Navigation program in the Soviet territorial sea.2 31 Accordingly, with-
out prejudice to its right of innocent passage, the United States in-
formed the Soviet Union that it did not intend to conduct further
Freedom of Navigation challenges in Soviet territorial waters.232 The
State Department noted, however, that the warships of both countries
retain the right to conduct innocent passage incidental to normal navi-
gation in the territorial sea.23 Moreover, it added that the United
States would continue to conduct routine operations in the Black Sea
and that the U.S. retained its right to exercise innocent passage in any
territorial sea in the world.23
IV. An Analysis of the Freedom of Navigation Program
The purpose of the Freedom of Navigation program is to exercise
U.S. rights "in the face of excessive maritime claims in order to pro-
tect the international legal principles upon which [U.S.] navigation
and overflight rights and freedoms are based." ' -' According to the
Department of State:
231. Department of State CIRCTEL No. 311861 (Sept. 28, 1989).
232. Specifically, Secretary Baker delivered a letter to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
which noted that "without prejudice to its rights to exercise innocent passage, the United
States of America has no intentions to conduct innocent passage with its warships in the
territorial sea of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics in the Black Sea." Id. See also
Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, Peace Comes to the Black Sea, 18 ARMS CONTROL TODAY
22, 22 (July-Aug. 1990). In response, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze delivered a
letter to Secretary Baker which provided:
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics notes the signing of the Joint Interpreta-
tion by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America
on Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent
Passage as well as actions by the United States of America to implement the Joint
Statement. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics confirms that all differences
which may arise between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United
States of America regarding a particular case of passage of ships should be settled
through diplomatic channels.
Letter sent from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. to the Secretary of State of
the U.S., in Memorandum from the Department of State Division of Language Services
(Aug. 30, 1989) (declassified June 5, 1990).
233. Draft letter from Secretary of State Baker to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, In
Action Memorandum from Frederick Bernthal to Secretary of State (Sept. 5, 1989) (de-
classified June 5, 1990) [hereinafter Action Memorandum].
234. i& at 1.
235. Telegram from the Department of State, Washington D.C. to CINCUSNAVEUR
(Feb. 16, 1983) (declassified Oct. 8, 1992).
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International law is made not just by documents, but by practice.
When a country claims greater jurisdiction over the seas than that to
which it is entitled under international law, it is appropriate to pro-
test. Protests, however, are no guarantee that illegal maritime
claims will not eventually acquire defacto, even dejure, status. That
is why this country has a program of asserting in practice our navi-
gational rights and freedoms under international law. 6
In this respect, the FON program is the most recent manifestation
of a basic principle of U.S. foreign policy that can be traced back over
two-hundred years.
A. The U.S. Rationale
The FON program is based upon the two principal sources of
public international law: (1) customary international law and (2)
treaty law.3 7 This justification occurs on two levels. First, the United
States has argued that the substantive nature of the FON program-
freedom of navigation-is grounded in both customary international
law and the 1982 LOS Conventionl -s While the United States did not
sign the 1982 LOS Convention until 1994, it has consistently argued
that the provisions of the Convention governing navigation and other
traditional uses codify customary international law. Consequently,
236. Department of State Memorandum (Apr. 26, 198S) (declassified Aug. 10, 19S9).
237. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice identifies four
sources of international law: (1) international conventions; (2) international custom; (3)
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and (4) judicial decisions and the
teachings of highly qualified publicists. I.CJ. Statute, art. 38 (1945), repruited n IrN-M-ptrx.,
TIONAL COURT OF JusTicE, No. 5, ACTS AND Docu.Nmms CONCERNING THE OPGA.NIA.
TION OF THE COURT 77 (19S9). Customary international law and treaty law are considered
the two principal sources of international law. As noted by Phillip Trimble, "customary
international law consists of obligations inferred from the general practice of states-.:hat
is habitually done by most members of the international community out of a sense of legal
obligation." Phillip Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Lan, 33
UCLA L. Rnv. 665, 669 (1986). In contrast, "[t]reaty law consists of expressly accepted
obligations spelled out in international agreements freely adhered to by states." Id. Both
customary international law and treaty law are viewed as equally authoritative. Id. But see
MAR. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAw AND TR.ATiEs 34-36 (19S5); Michael
Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 47 Bp.rr. Y.B. Tr'L L. 273
(1977).
238. For an analysis of the development of freedom of navigation, see generally Fpni..
cis NGANTCHA, THE RiGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE I';E=.
NATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1990); POTTER, supra note 3; RtP. Anand, The Tyranny of the
Freedom of the Seas Doctrine, 12 INT'L STUD. 416 (1973); Ruth Lapidoth, Freedom of Navi-
gation: Its Legal History and Normative Basis, 6 J. MAR. L. & Com. 259 (1974-75).
239. Brian Hoyle, The Status of LOS Non-Seabed Provisions as Customary Interna-
tional Law: United States Government Perspective, in THm UNrID STATES WTmOUT THE
LAw OF THE SEA TREATY, supra note 147, at 133-37 ("Upon close examination, one would
1996]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the United States has asserted that the FON program is consistent
with both customary international law and the 1982 LOS
Convention.240
Second, the United States has argued that the legal nature of the
FON program is grounded in both customary international law and
treaty law. Specifically, the rules governing the development of cus-
tomary international law and the existence of ambiguous provisions in
the 1982 LOS Convention require that the United States conduct
FON operations to assert its navigational rights and clarify ambiguous
treaty provisions. The following section examines the legal basis for
the FON program.
1. Customary International Law
According to international law, state practice that is continuous
and long-standing may develop into customary international law and
be considered legally binding on those states that have acquiesced in
its formation and development. 241 Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) defines international custom
as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law."242 According to
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, "[c]ustomary international law results from a general and con-
sistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obliga-
tion. 24 3 In The Scotia, the U.S. Supreme Court described the
development of customary international law with respect to the law of
the sea in the following manner:
Undoubtedly no single nation can change the law of the sea. That
law is of universal obligation, and no statute of one or two nations
can create obligations for the world. Like all the laws of nations, it
rests upon the common consent of civilized communities. It is of
force, not because it was prescribed by any superior power, but be-
cause it has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct.... Many
find that prevailing State practice today is consistent with the LOS Convention and that
most States would consider that State practice to be subject to a legal obligation to behave
in that way."). See generally David Treat, The United States' Claims of Customary Legal
Rights Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 253 (1984).
240. Bruce Harlow, The Status of LOS Non-Seabed Provisions as Customary Interna-
tional Law: Defense, in THE UNrTED STATES Wrrotrr THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY,
supra note 147, at 122-26.
241. See BRuusx, supra note 6, at 59-62; BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 4-11. See also
Josef Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AN. J. INT'L L. 662 (1953).
242. I.CJ. Statute, art. 38(1)(b) (1945), supra note 237, at 77.
243. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES
§ 102(2) (1986).
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of the usages which prevail, and which have the force of law, doubt-
less originated in the positive prescription of some single state,
which were at first of limited effect, but which when generally ac-
cepted become of universal obligation.244
On this same topic, Myres McDougal wrote that the international
law of the sea is:
a process of continuous interaction, of continuous demand and re-
sponse, in which the decision-makers of particular nation states uni-
laterally put forward claims of the most diverse and conflicting
character to the use of the world's seas, and in which other decision-
makers, external to the demanding state and including both national
and international officials, weigh and appraise these comp2ting
claims in terms of the interests of the world community and of the
rival claimants, and ultimately accept or reject them.245
The basis of customary international law, therefore, is the notion that
"states in and by their international practice may implicitly consent to
the creation and application of international legal rules."24
The sources of customary international law are found in state
practice.2 47 Sources of custom are numerous and may include diplo-
matic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions
of legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions, executive deci-
sions and practices, orders to naval forces, international and national
judicial decisions, treaty provisions, and other international obliga-
tions.2" The Restatement (Third) notes that the practice of states "in-
cludes diplomatic acts and instructions as well as public measures and
other governmental acts and official statements of policy, whether
they are unilateral or undertaken in cooperation with other states.""4 9
244. The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-SS (1871). See also The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900) ("By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centu-
ries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coast fishing vess2ls, pursu-
ing their vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt,
with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war.").
245. Myres McDougal, Editorial Comment, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the Interna.
tional Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356, 356-57 (1955).
246. MARK JAN1s, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (2d ed. 19S4)
247. MNicHAEL AKEHuRST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO Ir-mwR=A L Lw 24
(1987). See generally William Burke, Customary Law of the Sea. Advocacy or Disinter-
ested Scholarship?, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 508 (19S9); Louis Sohn, The La;V of the Sca" Cus-
tomaty International Law Developments, 34 AL U. L. Rlv. 271 (1955).
248. BROWNLiE, supra note 5, at 5. The ICJ has noted that the form of the protest is
not decisive and that "the sole relevant question is whether the language employed in any
given declaration does reveal a clear intention." Temple of Preah Vihear (Camboiia v.
Thail.), 1961 LCJ. 17, 32 (May 26).
249. RFSTATEMmNT (THiRD), supra note 243, § 102 cmt. b.
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In addition to these traditional sources, omission and silence may be
considered relevant in the development of customary international
law. State inaction may imply ratification through acquiescence °0
The decisions of both the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice suggest that the failure
of a state to take certain action may be deemed relevant in determin-
ing the status of customary international law.25'
Some scholars and jurists have suggested that only physical acts
can constitute state practice giving rise to the development of a cus-
tomary norm of international law. Thus, diplomatic statements and
other non-physical acts are insufficient to affect the development of
customary international law. Anthony D'Amato has argued that
" [w]hen a rule is alleged to be a rule of 'custom,' the person asserting
the rule must adduce a qualitative articulation of the rule and a quan-
titative element as well." 2  Indeed, while diplomatic claims may ar-
ticulate a legal norm, they cannot constitute the material component
of custom. According to D'Amato "for a state has not done anything
when it makes a claim; until it takes enforcement action, the claim has
little value as a prediction of what the state will actually do."253 In his
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries dissent, Judge Read of the ICJ stated that:
Customary international law ... cannot be established by citing
cases where coastal [s]tates have made extensive claims, but have
not maintained their claims by the actual assertion of sovereignty
over foreign ships .... The only convincing evidence of State prac-
250. ViLLIGER, supra note 237, at 18-20; Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of In-
ternational Law, 47 Brr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1977). See generally I.C. MacGibbon, Cus-
tomary International Law and Acquiescence, 33 BrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 115 (1958).
251. In the Lotus case, the PCIJ examined whether Turkey could exercise criminal ju-
risdiction to prosecute a French citizen for acts committed on the high seas. Specifically,
the Court looked to whether customary law authorized Turkey to exercise such jurisdic-
tion. In its analysis, the Court indicated that state inaction could give rise to a customary
norm of international law. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 28 (Oct.
12).
In the Nottebohm case, Liechtenstein sought to exercise its jurisdiction on behalf of a
naturalized citizen against Guatemala before the International Court of Justice. Not-
tebohm (Liecht. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6). Guatemala challenged the proceedings,
arguing that there were insufficient contacts between Liechtenstein and the naturalized
citizen that would authorize Liechtenstein's exercise of jurisdiction. Id. at 12. In its analy-
sis, the Court examined state practice to determine whether Liechtenstein's assertion of
jurisdiction was appropriate. Id. at 20-24. The Court held that Liechtenstein could not
extend its protection to the citizen in this case. Id. at 26.
252. ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPr OF CusToM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87
(1971).
253. Id. at 88.
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tice is to be found in seizures, where the coastal [s]tate asserts its
sovereignty over trespassing ships.2s4
Consistency of state practice is essential for the development of
customary international law?5 s The emphasis on consistency is based
on the notion that customary international law depends upon its regu-
lar observance in practice5 6 In the Asylum case, the International
Court of Justice examined the customary practice of granting diplo-
matic asylum.257 According to the ICJ, the party which relies on a
custom must prove that it is established in such a manner that it has
become binding on the other party and that the rule is in accordance
with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the states in ques-
tion." s It refused to acknowledge that the alleged practice of granting
diplomatic asylum had become a customary rule of international law
254. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.CJ. 116. 191 (Dac. 18) (dissent-
ing opinion of Judge Read).
255. As noted by Ambassador Richardson in 19S0, "the survival of any principle of
customary international law depends upon the consistency of its observance in practice."
Richardson, Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea, supra note 141, at 969. He recog-
nized, however, that the achievement of consistency does not come easily "in the face of
constant pressures to give priority to the preservation of cordial bilateral relations." Id.
Following the disclosure of the Freedom of Navigation program, Ambassador Richardson
noted that numerous U.S. government officials had appealed to him "for the blurring or
delay of activities of the kind referred to in the CINCLANT communication on such
grounds as the 'adverse effect on other matters on which we are seeking their support,"
'jeopardy to important American economic interests,' 'repercussions on sensitive bilateral
developments,' and the like." Id.
The importance of consistency wAas exemplified during an evaluation of propos-d FON
operations conducted from October 1982 through March 1983. In reviewing the proposed
navigation and overflight program that was to be conducted in the Black Sea, Rear Admi-
ral S.H. Packer, Acting Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, argued that in order to main-
tain a uniform policy, the United States should not challenge Bulgaria's excessive maritime
claims unless it also challenged the Soviet Union's claims. Memorandum from Rear Admi-
ral SL Pacher to the Director, Joint Staff (Oct. 28, 192) (declassified Jan. 17, 1991) (on
file with author). According to Admiral Packer, the Navy firmly adhered to the v.iew that a
challenge to Bulgaria's warship notification regime without challenging the identical Soviet
claim in the Black Sea would be counterproductive and undermine the appearance of U.S.
resolve in the face of illegal claims. Id. Such passivity would suggest reluctance to chal-
lenge the illegal maritime arrogations of powerful adversaries, which in turn could well b
construed as acquiescence to such claims. Admiral Packer noted that "although the Navy
is committed to the proposition that eventually all excessive maritime claims must be chal-
lenged, no challenge can be either considered or executed in isolation from all pertinent
political, military, geographic or juridical factors." Id. In this case, those factors substan-
tially outweighed the benefit that might be gained by challenging Bulgaria's claims alone.
Id
256. The duration, frequency, uniformity and generality of a practice provide evidence
of consistency. BROWNLEm, supra note 5, at 5-6.
257. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 LCJ. 266 (Nov. 20).
258. Id. at 276-77.
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since the facts disclosed so much fluctuation. 59 According to the
Court, "[t]he facts brought to the knowledge of the Court disclose so
much uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrep-
ancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and in the official views ex-
pressed on various occasions, there has been so much inconsistency
... that it is not possible to discern in all this any constant and uniform
usage, accepted as law.' ' 6°
This analysis suggests that the development of customary interna-
tional law may be successfully challenged by states who continuously
object to its formation.26' When the acts of some states encounter
protests from other states, these acts and protests often cancel each
other out.262 The doctrine of protest is consistent with the positivist
theory of international law-states can only be bound by their
consent.263
Lassa Oppenheim defined protest as "a formal communication
from one State to another that it objects to an act performed, or con-
templated, by the latter."264 A more elaborate definition was pro-
vided by I.C. MacGibbon:
[A] formal objection by which the protesting State makes it known
that it does not recognize the legality of the acts against which the
protest is directed, that it does not acquiesce in the situation which
such acts have created or which they threaten to create, and that it
has no intention of abandoning its own rights in the premises.
265
Thus, a protest serves three purposes: it challenges the development
of customary international law; it enables a state to escape from being
259. 1d. at 277.
260. Id.
261. See VILLmiER, supra note 237, at 15-17. See generally Ted Stein, The Approach of
the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26
HARV. In'L LJ. 457 (1985). But see D'AMATO, supra note 252. Anthony D'Amato has
argued that the persistent objector rule only applies in the case of special custom. Whereas
general customary law applies to all states, special custom applies to a limited group of
states. Examples of special custom include nongeneralizable topics such as title to territo-
rial areas or rules expressly limited to countries of a certain region. Id. at 233-62.
262. Ai EHumsT, supra note 247, at 39.
263. See generally FRANcis ANTHONY BoYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 18-19 (1985); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 12-13
(1954); Roberto Ago, Positivism, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 385
(1984); I.M. Lobo De Souza, The Role of State Consent in the Customary Process, 44 INT'L
& Comp. L.Q. 521 (1995); Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task
and Method, 2 AM. J. INTL L. 313 (1908).
264. LASsA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 789 (7th ed. 1949).
265. I.C. MacGibbon, Some Observations on the Part of Custom, 30 BIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
293, 298 (1954).
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bound by the development of an emerging norm of international law;
and it provides a state with the opportunity to promote the acceptance
of its own viewpoints as to the proper status of the law.: ' The Inter-
national Court of Justice acknowledged the use of protest by a state to
successfully challenge the development of customary international law
in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case where it held that a maritime
delimitation rule on bays "would appear to be inapplicable as against
Norway, in as much as she has always opposed any attempt to apply it
to the Norwegian coast."267
The Freedom of Navigation program is used to challenge the de-
velopment of customary international law and "to lower the expecta-
tion of coastal states that their illegal claims will be observed.-'(S In
its 1993 Ocean Policy Review, the Department of Defense recognized
that international law "derives from the practice of nations in the in-
ternational arena."2 69 Thus, the FON program was necessary to "pre-
serve fundamental freedoms of navigation and overflight.12 7d
In addition, the FON program is used by the United States to
promote acceptance of its own views on the law of the sea. In 1986,
David Colson, then Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans, International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs at the State Department, noted
that a state may not only wish to avoid being bound by developing
international law that is contrary to its interests, but it may also hope
to promote acceptance of its own viewpoint as to the proper interpre-
tation of the law3 71 According to Mr. Colson, the Freedom of Navi-
gation program promotes the U.S. view of international law,., z2 1
Indeed, "[t]hese operations ... are a clear statement of the national
resolve to maintain navigational rights and freedoms and to mold cus-
tomary international law into the desired form.""73
The FON program is also based upon the assertion of rights doc-
trine which provides that a state may affirm a right which has been
unjustly denied and is not bound to abstain from exercising its rights
266. Prosper Well, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 Am. J. r.r'L
L. 413, 433-34 (1983).
267. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 LCJ. 116, 131 (Dac. IS).
268. Message from the Department of State to CINCUSNAVEUR (Apr. 22, 19S7) (dc-
classified Oct. 8, 1992).
269. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENsE, OcEAN Poucy REiEW, supra note 22, at x.
270. Id. at 18.
271. David Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 VAsH. L. REv.
957, 968 (1986).
272. See id.
273. Il
1996]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
under international law.274 One of the earliest pronouncements of
this doctrine was expressed by the International Court of Justice in the
Corfu Channel case.275 In 1946, Albania sought to prohibit passage
through the Corfu Channel, asserting that the Channel constituted Al-
banian territorial waters and that no vessel had a right to enter with-
out prior notification and authorization.276 On May 15, Albanian
shore batteries fired upon two British warships passing through the
Channel.277 The United Kingdom immediately protested the attack,
asserting that international law recognized the right of innocent pas-
sage for warships through the Channel.278 The British government
warned that if Albanian coastal batteries opened fire on any British
warship passing through the Strait, the warships would respond with
force.279 On October 22, the British sent two warships to assert Brit-
ish navigational rights through the Channel.280  While steaming
through the Channel, the warships were struck by mines and heavily
damaged.2 ' Three weeks later, the Channel was swept by a large
force of British minesweepers. The minesweeping operation discov-
ered and cut several mines. 2
The United Kingdom presented a complaint against Albania to
the U.N. Security Council which, after several months of investigation
and debate, recommended that the dispute be submitted to the Inter-
national Court of Justice.28 The ICJ was asked to examine whether
the United Kingdom violated Albanian sovereignty when it sought to
assert its navigational rights through the Channel.2s4 TWo questions
were submitted to the ICJ:
(1) Is Albania responsible under international law for the explo-
sions which occurred on the 22nd October 1946 in Albanian waters
274. BRIERLY, supra note 6, at 427-30; MARJORIE WHIVTEmAN, DGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 52-55 (1971); McDougal, supra note 245, at 156-57. But see IAN BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 256,264-68 (1963); Arvid Pardo,
Commentary, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES (Ryan
Amacher & Richard Sweeney eds., 1983).
275. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4 (Apr. 9). See generally J.M. Jones, The
Corfu Channel Case: Merits, 26 Bnrr. Y.B. I, r'L L. 447 (1949); Quincy Wright, The Corfu
Channel Case, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. (1949).
276. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 12 (Apr. 9).
277. Id at 27.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id at 28.
281. Id at 12-13.
282. Id at 13.
283. Id at 5.
284. Id. at 6.
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and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted from them
and is there any duty to pay compensation? '
(2) Has the United Kingdom under international law violated the
sovereignty of the Albania People's Republic by reason of the acts
of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on the 22nd October and on
the 12th and 13th November 1946 and is there any duty to give
satisfaction? 2
S6
As to the first question, the ICJ held that "Albania is responsible
under international law for the explosions which occurred... in Alba-
nian waters, and for the damage and loss of human life that resulted
therefrom."8 7 As to the second question, the ICJ held that "the
United Kingdom did not violate the sovereignty of... Albania by
reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters on October
22nd, 1946." s
The legality of this measure taken by the Government of the United
Kingdom cannot be disputed, provided that it was carried out in a
manner consistent with the requirements of international law. The
"mission" was designed to affirm a right which had been unjustly
denied. The Government of the United Kingdom was not bound to
abstain from exercising its right of passage, which the Albanian
Government had illegally denied.3 9
The Court's analysis suggests that if a state has a legal right under
international law and another state wrongfully and forcibly persists in
interfering with its exercise, the first state is not bound to submit to
the lawless use of force by the second but may lawfully assert its right
by the threat and use of force.290 The ICJ noted, however, that the
acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters on November 12 and 13,
1946 "violated the sovereignty of... Albania and that this declaration
by the Court constitutes in itself appropriate satisfaction."2' '91 The
minesweeping operation "could not be justified as the exercise of a
right of innocent passage and... international law does not allow a
285. 1&
286. Id
287. Id. at 36.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 30. The ICY concluded that the passage was innocent despite its purpose to
assert navigational rights. Id. See Rolph, supra note 142, at 15S-60.
290. BpmRLY, supra note 6, at 429; Gerald Fitzmaurice, The La= and Procedure of the
International Court of Justice, 27 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 27-31 (1954). See generally RE.
Ward, The Right of Innocent Passage and the Legality of Reprisals, 13 S. DIEGo L. RE.
765 (1975).
291. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 LCJ. 4, 36 (Apr. 9).
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State to assemble a large number of warships in the territorial waters
of another State and to carry out minesweeping in those waters. ' '2 9?
In summary, the importance of state practice in developing and
affirming international rights suggests the need for operational con-
duct by states. Thus, the U.S. government has argued that customary
international law provides a powerful justification for the Freedom of
Navigation program.
2. The 1982 LOS Convention
Along with customary international law, international treaties are
considered a principal source of international law.293 Treaties can
both codify customary international law and create new sources of in-
ternational law.294 While the United States did not sign the LOS Con-
vention until 1994, it has consistently argued that the provisions of the
Convention governing navigation and other traditional uses codify
customary international law.295 In addition, the United States has in-
dicated that it considers itself bound by the provisions of the Conven-
tion relating to traditional uses of the oceans, including navigational
292. Id. at 34.
293. Article 1(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines "treaty" as
"an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
23, 1969, art. 1(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]. According to Brownlie, a law-making treaty creates "legal obligations the
observance of which does not dissolve the treaty obligation." BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at
12. He adds that "[I]aw making treaties create general norms for future conduct of the
parties in terms of legal propositions, and the obligations are basically the same for all
parties." Id.
294. The Restatement (Third) provides that "[i]ntemational agreements create law for
the states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of customary international law when
such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely
accepted." RESTATEmENT (THiRD), supra note 243, § 102(3).
In addition, the ICJ noted in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases that customary
international law and treaty law can codify identical rules. North Sea Continental Shelf
(F.R.G. v. DenJNeth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 39 (Feb. 20). See generally HARoLD THIRLWAY, IN.
TERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIICATrION (1972); Richard Baxter, Treaties and
Custom, 129 R.C.A.D.I. 25 (1970); Richard Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of
Customary International Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275 (1965-66); Jonathan Charney,
International Agreements and the Development of Customary International Law, 61 WASH.
L. REx,. 971 (1986).
295. See generally Thomas Clingan, Jr., Freedom of Navigation in a Post-UNCLOS III
Environment, 46 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (1983); Bruce Harlow, Comment, 46 LAw
& CONTEM. PRoBS. 125 (1983).
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rights.296 Thus, the United States views the 1982 LOS Convention as
an important source of international law.2 97
Despite the extensive nature of the negotiations leading to the
adoption of the 1982 LOS Convention, several ambiguous and inde-
terminate provisions remain in the English language text.293 In addi-
tion, a careful analysis reveals that conflicting interpretations exist
among the six different language texts of the LOS Convention.F9
These ambiguities are significant for they allow states to argue that
their particular interpretations of the 1982 LOS Convention are valid.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties contains several
provisions concerning the interpretation of treaties.-s Article 31(1)
provides that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.211 Article
31(2) adds that the context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble
and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
296. Hearings, supra note 87, at 19.
297. For a description of customary international law in the context of the law of the
sea, see Anatoly Kolodkin & Anatoly Zakharov, The UN Convention on the Lamv of the
Sea and Customary Law, in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITW STATES AND
TEE LAW OF Tm SEA 166 (Jon Van Dyke ed., 1985); John King Gamble & Maria Frankow-
ska, The 1982 Convention and Customary Law of the Sea: Observations, a Framework and
a Warning, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 491 (1984); John King Gamble, The Trealy/Custom
Dichotomy: An Overview, 16 Tnx. INrL L.J. 305 (1981); Lawrence Howard, The Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the TreatylCustom Didzotomy, 16
TEx. INT'L L.J 321 (1981).
298. For a list of ambiguous provisions, see KEN BooTH, LAW, FORCE, AND DIwLo-
mAcy AT SEA 74-89 (1985). See also UNITED NATIONS, THE LAW OF Tm SEA: PRATnCE
OF STATES AT THE TLm OF ENTRY INTo FORCE OF THE UNrTED NATIONS CONVF--oTION
ON m LAW OF m SEA (1994) [hereinafter UNrrED NATiONS, THE L.v oF niE SEA].
Charney, supra note 95, passim; Jonathan Charney, Progress in International Maritime
Boundary Delimitation Law, 8S Am. J. INT'L L. 227 (1994) (describing the indeterminacy of
the maritime delimitation provisions in the 1982 LOS Convention).
299. The 1982 LOS Convention was drafted in six authentic language texts: Arabic,
Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. LOS Convention, supra note 50, art. 320.
A State Department analysis of the 1982 LOS Convention identified language differences
in several provisions of the Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish texts of the Convention.
Department of State Memorandum from David Small (Aug. 31, 19SS) (declassified Aug.
10, 1989).
300. Vienna Convention, supra note 293.
301. Id art. 31(1).
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(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in con-
nection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.302
Article 31(3) provides that there shall be taken into account, to-
gether with the context of the treaty:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the in-
terpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
and
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.303
Article 32 provides that recourse may be had to supplementary
means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty
and the circumstances of its conclusion when application of the provi-
sions of article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads
to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.3"
Under the provisions of the Vienna Convention, therefore, state
practice is considered relevant for the interpretation of treaty provi-
sions. Indeed, the use of subsequent state practice to clarify treaty
provisions is considered a customary rule of international law.30 5
Both the Permanent Court of International Justice and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice have consistently held that subsequent state
practice maintains probative value as to the meaning and understand-
ing of treaty provisions.30 6 For example, the PCIJ noted in the Com-
petence of the International Labour Organization With Respect to
Agricultural Labour case that if there was any ambiguity in the Treaty
of Versailles, "the Court might, for the purpose of arriving at the true
meaning, consider the action which has been taken under the
Treaty. '3 7 The International Court of Justice alluded to the use of
state practice in guiding treaty interpretation when it noted in the
Corfu Channel case that "the subsequent attitude of the Parties shows
it has not been their intention, by entering into the Special Agree-
302. Id. art. 31(2)(a)-(b).
303. Id art. 31(3)(a)-(c).
304. Id. art. 32.
305. LORD McNAnR, Tim LAW OF TREATiEs 424-31 (1961). See also Gerald McGinley,
Practice as a Guide to Treaty Interpretation, FLETCHER FORUM 227 (Winter 1985).
306. IAN SrNcLAm, THm VENNA CONVENTION ON Tim LAW OF TpAnEs 136-37 (2d
ed. 1984).
307. Competence of the International Labour Organization With Respect to Agricul-
tural Labour, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 2, at 39 (Aug. 12).
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ment, to preclude the Court from fixing the amount of the
compensation. '30 8
For these reasons, the United States has used the Freedom of
Navigation program to clarify ambiguous provisions and promote the
acceptance of its own views on the 1982 LOS Convention. As early as
1983, Commander Dennis Neutze, then Legal Adviser to the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations, suggested that the clearest interpretation
of the ambiguous language of the 1982 LOS Convention would be the
"actual operational practices of those who base their navigational
rights on its provisions." 3°9 Through its operational practices, the
United States should clearly demonstrate its understanding that the
language of the Convention has no significant impact on naval mobil-
ity.311 Such practices would help interpret the 1982 LOS Convention
and shape the customary international law that would define the
rights and duties of nonsignatories. Thus, Commander Neutze indi-
cated that "[the United States must continue to operate its forces in a
manner that ensures the treaty's language is properly interpreted and
demonstrates to the world that the United States is firmly resolved to
maintain its navigational freedoms."'311
There have been several attempts by states to exploit ambiguities
in the 1982 LOS Convention.312 Indeed, a recent study by the United
Nations indicates that despite the extensive codification effort in the
LOS Convention, the practice of several states diverges on certain is-
sues, including the breadth of the territorial sea and the right of inno-
cent passage for warships. 313
For example, a critical point of contention between the United
States and the Soviet Union concerned the scope of article 22, para-
graph 1 of the Convention: specifically, does the Convention allow
308. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 LCJ. 4,25 (Apr. 9).
309. Commander Dennis Neutze, Whose Law of Whose Sea?, 109 NAVAL. IN-r. PnoTo
COL 43, 48 (1983).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Several states have argued that the innocent passage provisions of the Convention
do not preclude a coastal state from establishing prior authorization requirements. Thus,
upon signing the Convention, a number of countries indicated that they would require
prior notification before entry into their territorial seas. Similarly, other states have sought
to prohibit the entry of nuclear-powered vessels or ships carrying hazardous materials into
their territorial seas. Charney, supra note 294, at 992 See generalt' Lewis Alexander,
Uncertainties in the Aftermath of UNCLOS III: The Case for Navigational Freedoms, 18
OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 333 (1987).
313. UNrrED NATIONS, THE LAw OF T - SEA, supra, note 298, passim. In fact, sixteen
countries continue to claim a territorial sea in excess of twelve miles. Id at 5.
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coastal states to limit innocent passage for navigational safety consid-
erations, or may sea lane restrictions be imposed when necessary for
other purposes (e.g., to protect national security)?3 14 According to
the State Department, a state can impose sea lane restrictions that
limit innocent passage only if they are based on navigational safety
considerations.3 15 The State Department noted that Soviet maritime
regulations violated the provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention by
completely prohibiting the exercise of innocent passage in the Black
Sea.316 The Soviets, however, indicated that the Russian language text
of the Convention did not limit the coastal state to such restrictions.
Rather, article 22 gave the coastal state authority to establish sea lanes
and traffic separation schemes to regulate innocent passage in territo-
rial waters whenever necessary.317 This dispute was a principal cause
of the February 1988 bumping incident in the Black Sea.318
During negotiations between the United States and the Soviet
Union following the bumping incident, differences between the Eng-
lish and Russian language text versions of article 22 were discovered.
A subsequent analysis conducted by the Department of State revealed
that the Russian language text of article 22, paragraph 1, allows the
coastal state to regulate the right of innocent passage whenever neces-
sary.319 The English language text of article 22 provides: "The coastal
314. For a detailed analysis of this issue, see William J. Aceves, Ambiguities in Pluril-
ingual Treaties: A Case Study of Article 22 of the 1982 LOS Convention (1995) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with author).
315. See generally OFF-ICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, HIGHLIGHTS OF US/USSR
BILATERAL TECHNICAL LOS DISCUSSIONS: NAVIGATIONAL ISSUES (Apr. 26, 1988) (de-
classified Sept. 24, 1991).
316. Office of Secretary of Defense Highlights of US/USSR Technical LOS Discussion:
Innocent Passage and Other Navigational Issues (Aug. 23, 1988) (declassified Sept. 24,
1991), at 8.
317. Id. at 9.
318. UNITED NATIONS, THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 298, at 123-24. See generally
Shao Jin, The Question of Innocent Passage of Warships: After UNCLOS III, 13 MARINE
POL'Y 56 (1989). For a discussion of the Black Sea incident, see supra notes 201-34 and
accompanying text.
319. Interestingly, of the six official languages on the 1982 LOS Convention, only the
Arabic text was identical to the English text. Discrepancies with the English version ex-
isted in the Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish texts. For example, the French text of
article 22(1) reads:
The coastal [s]tate may, when the security of navigation so dictates, require for-
eign ships exercising the right of innocent passage in its territorial sea to use the
sea lanes it designates and to abide by the traffic separation schemes it prescribes
for the regulation of the passage of ships.
The Spanish text reads as follows:
The coastal [s]tate may, when necessary taking into account the safety of naviga-
tion, require foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through its
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state may, where necessary having regard to the safety of navigation,
require foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through
its territorial sea to use such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes
as it may designate or prescribe for the regulation of the passage of
ships."320 In contrast, the relevant Russian text, translated into Eng-
lish, reads as follows:
The coastal state, in the event of necessity and with regard to the
safety of navigation, may require foreign ships exercising the right
of innocent passage through its territorial sea to use such sea lanes
and traffic separation schemes as it may designate or prescribe for
the regulation of the passage of ships.3 "1
By identifying the lack of concordance in the English and Russian
language texts of article 22, the United States and the Soviet Union
resolved a significant obstacle in the negotiations regarding innocent
passage. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to
focus on the principal issue at stake: the balance between the security
interests of the coastal state and the right of innocent passage for war-
ships in the territorial sea. The result was a pragmatic solution. The
Soviet Union agreed to amend its border regulations in conformity
with the U.S. understanding of article 22. Specifically, it recognized
that warships enjoy the right of innocent passage in the territorial
sea.3 In addition, the establishment of sea lanes and traffic-separa-
tion schemes was permissible only "where needed to protect the
safety of navigation."113 In response, the United States communi-
cated to the Soviet Union that since Soviet border regulations had
been amended, it had no reason to exercise its right of innocent pas-
sage in Soviet territorial waters.3 24
territorial sea to use such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as it may desig-
nate or prescribe for the regulation of the passage of ships.
Department of State Memorandum from Jim Feeney (Sept. 12, 19SS) (declassified Aug. 10,
1989).
320. LOS Convention, supra note 50, art. 22.
321. Department of State Memorandum from Alexis Obolensky (Sept. 12, 19:S) (de-
classified Aug. 10, 1989).
322. Uniform Interpretation, supra note 226.
323. Id. State Department officials recognized that the arrangement "constitutes a sub-
stantial shift in tradition Soviet views .... It would resolve a significant dispute betivan
the United States and the Soviet Union and would promote the United States' global inter-
ests in uniform application of the rules of international law regarding navigation rights."
Action Memorandum from Frederick Bernthal to the Secretary of State (Sept. 5. 19S9)
(declassified June 5, 1990).
324. Department of State CIRCITL No. 311861, supra note 231. See also supra note
232 and accompanying text.
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In summary, state practice is important for developing and clari-
fying ambiguous and indeterminate provisions in the 1982 LOS Con-
vention. According to the U.S. government, the Freedom of
Navigation program plays an important role in this process.
B. A Critique of the U.S. Position
Despite its reliance on the principal sources of public interna-
tional law, the U.S. rationale for the FON program can be criticized
on both legal and normative grounds.
1. A Legalist Critique
When a coastal state asserts an objectionable claim, the United
States usually delivers a diplomatic protest to that country. If an ac-
ceptable resolution is not reached, the United States has felt com-
pelled to assert its legal position by sending its vessels or aircraft
through the disputed area. The United States has argued that if it
does not protest illegal violations of its rights under international law,
such inaction may imply ratification through acquiescence. However,
this analysis fails to consider the doctrine of opinio juris.
For state practice to become a rule of customary international
law, it must appear that states follow that practice from a sense of
legal obligation.3' Opinio juris provides a qualitative element to the
development of customary international law. As noted in the Restate-
ment (Third), a practice that is generally followed but which states feel
legally free to disregard does not contribute to the development of
customary international law.326 Thus, for the United States to be
bound by development of a customary norm of international law, it
must knowingly and willingly accept the developing norm.
The Permanent Court of International Justice first enunciated the
doctrine of opinio juris in the Lotus case. 27 In the Lotus case, France
argued that a customary rule of international law had developed re-
garding criminal prosecution over acts committed aboard vessels on
the high seas.328 Because states had abstained from exercising juris-
325. See generally Olufemi Elias, The Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary
International Law, 44 IN'L & CoMp. L.Q. 501 (1995); BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 7-10;
HERSCH LAuTERPAcHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THL INTERNA-
TIONAL CotRT 379-81 (1958); LuciA M. MORENO, LA OPINIO JURIS EN EL DVRECHO
IN'ERNACaONAL CONTEMPORANEo (1991); 1 O'CoNNELL, supra note 8, at 3.
326. RESTATEmENT (TmiD), supra note 243, § 102 cmt. c.
327. Lotus (Fr. v. Trk), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 28 (Oct. 12).
328. Id. at 25-26.
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diction over such criminal acts, France argued that this practice had
developed into a customary norm prohibiting the exercise of jurisdic-
tion.329 The PCIJ found such evidence of state action insufficient.
Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found among the
reported cases were sufficient to prove in point of fact the circum-
stances alleged by the Agent for the French Government, it would
merely show that States had often, in practice, abstained from insti-
tuting criminal proceedings, and not that they recognized them-
selves as being obliged to do so; for only if such abstentions were
based on their being conscious of a duty to abstain would it be pos-
sible to speak of an international custom.
30
The International Court of Justice reiterated this doctrine in the
North Sea Continental Shelf cases. 31 In these cases, Denmark and the
Netherlands argued that the principle of equidistance for the purpose
of maritime boundary delimitation had become a customary rule of
international law. 332 The ICJ held that the equidistance principle had
not developed into customary international law.
[T]o achieve this result, two conditions must be fulfilled. Not only
must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must
also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the existence
of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio
juris sive necessitatis 333
In other words, states must feel that they are conforming to what
amounts to a legal obligation. Indeed, "[t]he frequency, or even habit-
ual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are many inter-
national acts, e.g. in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are
performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by consid-
erations of courtesy, convenience, or tradition, and not by any sense
of legal duty. 113 4 Similarly, in the Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, the ICJ noted:
[FIor a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts
concerned 'amount to a settled practice,' but they must be accompa-
nied by the opinio juris sive necessitatis. Either the States taking
329. Id. at 27-28.
330. Id. at 28.
331. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.RG v. DeniNeth.), 1969 I.CJ. 4 (Feb. 20).
332. lit at 10-11.
333. Id. at 38.
334. Id.
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such action or other States in a position to react to it, must have
behaved so that their conduct is evidence of a belief that this prac-
tice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective ele-
ment, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive
necessitati. 335
Thus, the U.S. assertion that it must act or lose its navigational
fights is somewhat misplaced. The doctrine of opinio juris is necessary
for the development of customary international law. Consequently,
the United States cannot be deemed to acquiesce in the formation of
customary international law unless it is doing so out of a sense of legal
obligation.
In addition, the U.S. legal position may be criticized for its unnec-
essary reliance on operational protests. Operational challenges are
not the exclusive means by which to protest a claim. In the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases, the International Court of Justice suggested
that diplomatic statements would be sufficient to establish a rule of
customary international law.336 If a diplomatic protest is prompt and
unequivocal, and if it is accompanied by other legitimate demonstra-
tions by a state to preserve its rights, this protest will suffice to counter
the continuity of a developing claim. 37 Indeed, the notion that opera-
tional protests are the only means of asserting state practice is the
minority position. 3 8
2. A Normative Critique
In addition to the legalist critique, international law provides nor-
mative reasons for criticizing the FON program. These normative
criticisms are grounded in the fundamental sources of international
law: customary international law, treaty law, and general principles of
international law.339
The February 1988 bumping incident between U.S. and Soviet
warships in the Black Sea illustrates the danger of using state practice
335. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4,108-09 (June 27).
336. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. DenJNeth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3,32-33 (Feb. 20).
337. MacGibbon, supra note 265, at 319.
338. AKEHURST, supra note 247, at 1. But see THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TE SEA:
CASES, DOCUMENTS AND READINGS, supra note 39, at 42-43.
339. The Restatement (Third) provides that "[a] rule of international law is one that has
been accepted as such by the international community of states: (a) in the form of custom-
ary law; (b) by international agreement; or (c) by derivation from general principles com-
mon to the major legal systems of the world." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 243,
§ 102(1).
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to determine the status of international law. If a state wishes to assert
a particular interpretation, it will seek to manifest its legal position by
state practice. If other states are equally firm in their resolve to assert
their interpretation by state practice, violent confrontations may re-
sult. From a practical perspective, if state practice is necessary for de-
termining the status of international law, this system will prejudice
small states that have no practical recourse to operational actions2 49
The notion that states must take action which may lead to a vio-
lent confrontation or lose their rights under international law is incon-
sistent with the most basic principles of international law. Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter provides that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.;'3 4 In
addition, article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter requires that "[a]ll Members
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not en-
dangered."' 2 The parties to such disputes are required to seek a solu-
tion by negotiation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or other peaceful
means.343 If such action fails to settle the dispute, the parties are re-
quired to submit the issue to the Security Council.?3
The 1982 LOS Convention also requires the peaceful settlement
of disputes.4 Article 279 provides that states shall settle any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the LOS Convention
by peaceful means in accordance with article 2(3) of the U.N. Char-
340. The inability of small states to effectively protest U.S. naval incursions is graphi-
cally documented in the following passage:
One Navy officer recalled an occasion when his cruiser was ordered to steam near
Albania, which claims a 15-mile territorial limit and demands advance notifica-
tion from approaching ships. Two Albanian hydrofoils.., . roared to %vithin a few
hundred feet of the U.S. ship, where they settled into the water,.. facing the
cruiser. The [Albanian] ground station barked out the coordinates and demanded
a response. 'We cannot locate the target,' one hydrofoil captain responded, and
the two boats turned and sped away.
Fred Hiatt, Four U.S. Navy Jets Challenge Libya's Sovereignty, WAsH. Poasr, July 27, 19,34
at 1. See also Colson, supra note 271, at 961.
341. U.N. CRTER art. 2, para. 4.
342. Id. art. 2, para. 3.
343. Ia art. 33.
344. Id. art. 37.
345. F. David Froman, Uncharted Waters: Non-Innocent Passage of Warships in the Ter-
ritorial Sea, 21 SAN DiEGo L. Rnv. 625, 667-78 (1984).
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ter. 6 While the Corfu Channel case affirms the assertion of rights
doctrine, the ICJ's opinion cannot be read isolated from other princi-
ples of international law. In his analysis of the Corfu Channel case,
J.L. Brierly noted that the conditions for a forcible affirmation of legal
rights only exist if the other state is "wrongfully denying by force the
exercise of those rights but also unwilling to use pacific means to settle
the dispute."' 7
A study by the Special Working Committee on Maritime Claims
of the American Society of International Law recognized the potential
for violent confrontation when states seek to affirm their legal posi-
tion through state action.Ms Specifically, the study examined situa-
tions where "the coastal state disputes the right of a maritime state to
navigate in or fly over an area near the coast."'' 9 According to the
Committee:
The coastal state may well regard the foreign power as impermissi-
bly intruding into its territory or maritime zones. The coastal state
would be concerned about the loss through acquiescence of its as-
serted rights off its coast not only as against that maritime state but
as against other states. The maritime state is concerned not only
about the loss through acquiescence of navigation rights off that
particular coastal state but, perhaps more importantly, about the
loss of navigation rights off the shores of other coastal states that
are encouraged to make or enforce similar claims. In principle, the
same rules apply to determine the maximum claims that can be
made by all coastal states in the world; if a friendly coastal state's
claim is accepted, the validity of a similar claim by an unfriendly
coastal state is all but conceded.350
This process leads inevitably towards conflict.
346. LOS Convention, supra note 50, art. 279. The LOS Convention offers several
forms of dispute resolution. See generally A.O. Adele, Law of the Sea: The Integration of
the System of Settlement of Disputes Under the Draft Convention as a Whole, 72 AM. J.
INT'L L. 84 (1978); E.D. Brown, Dispute Settlement, 5 MARINm PoL'y 282 (1981); A.R.
Carnegie, The Law of the Sea Tribunal, 28 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 669 (1979); John Noyes,
Compulsory Third-Party Adjudication and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 4 CorNN. J. Irr'L L. 675 (1989); Louis Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Arising Out
of the Law of the Sea Convention, 12 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 495 (1975); Yogesh Tyagi, The
System of Settlement of Disputes Under the Law of the Sea Convention: An Overview, 25
INDIAN J. INT'L L. 191 (1985).
347. BRIERLY, supra note 6, at 430.
348. See Alm~icAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, NONVIOLENT RESPONSES TO
VIOLENCE-PRONE PROBLEMS: THm CASES OF DISPUTED MARITIME CLAIMS AND STATE-
SPONSORED TERRORIsM (1991).
349. Id. at 1.
350. Id. at 2.
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When a coastal state makes a claim contested by a maritime state,
the maritime state typically delivers a diplomatic protest to the
coastal state. Each state has now staked out a legal position con-
tested by the other. A new problem arises because each is likely to
fear that unless it takes overt actions consistent with its position,
over time it will have acquiesced in the assertion of the other. Thus,
the maritime state is encouraged to send one or more vessels or
aircraft into the area to "enforce" its claimed right to use the area,
while the coastal state is encouraged to take military action to -en-
force" its claim against foreign ships. The potential for violence is
obvious.351
The Committee duly noted that theories of international law
which require either a coastal state or a maritime state to take affirma-
tive action that may entail a risk of armed conflict, solely to preserve
its contested claims, are in tension with the underlying principles and
purposes of the United Nations Charter. -5 When either the coastal
state or the maritime state implicitly or explicitly challenge the other
state to enforce its view of the law, both are being unduly provocative.
For this reason, the Committee concluded that "[w]hile we believe
that neither [state] is compelled to yield its legal position pending an
authoritative resolution of the matter, each should seek to minimize,
rather than maximize, the chances of a violent reaction by the
other."
353
Thus, the use of state practice to affirm a state's position on a
disputed issue must be carefully balanced against the ramifications
that may arise from such action. While the U.S. Freedom of Naviga-
tion operations in the Black Sea ultimately resulted in a successful
resolution of the dispute, such actions "carry very real risks of precipi-
tating violent interaction between nations or, at a minimum, generat-
.ing political ill-will."3
Another issue raised by this analysis is the doctrine of abuse of
rights.35 5 The abuse of rights doctrine has developed gradually in in-
351. Id. at 3.
352. Id. at 4.
353. Id.
354. Aceves, supra note 20, at 75; Rolph, supra note 142, at 164.
355. LAuTERPAcET, TiH DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LI:; BY" TIHE IhzEMNA.
TONAL COURT, supra note 325, at 162-65; HEnscH LAuTERPACHT, THE FurzcnO' . oF Lv.,&
IN THE INTERNATIONAL CoMNmrr y 286-306 (1933); Vera Goilland-Debbas, The Refa-
tionship Between the International Court of Justice and the Security Councd in the Light of
the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM. J. I r'L L. 643, 662 (1994). See also L.', BROWNLIE., SvsrTE1
OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RFsPosIsm.rrY, PAIr I (19S3).
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ternational law. 56 Early pronouncements of the doctrine were influ-
enced by the principle of good faith.3 57 The U.N. Charter compels all
member states to "fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by
them in accordance with the present Charter. s3 sS In the Conditions of
Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations case, the
dissenting judges noted that while states have a right to take political
considerations into account in deciding whether to grant a state ad-
mission to the U.N., every state has an overriding legal obligation "to
act in good faith (an obligation which moreover is enjoined by para-
graph 2 of article I of the Charter.)"35 9 In addition, article 300 of the
1982 LOS Convention provides that "States Parties shall fulfil in good
faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise
the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in
a manner which would not constitute an abuse of rights. ' '36°
The individual opinion of Judge Alvarez in the Corfu Channel
case presented one of the earliest pronouncements of the doctrine of
abuse of rights.36' Judge Alvarez noted that the misuse of a right was
not originally viewed as a violation of civil law.3 62 Anyone could exer-
cise his or her rights to the fullest extent possible, even if the effect
was prejudicial to others. Moreover, there was no duty to make repa-
rations. 63 Judge Alvarez noted, however, that civil codes had gradu-
ally begun to expressly prohibit the misuse of rights in private
relations.3 4 For example, article 226 of the German Civil Code pro-
vided that "[t]he exercise of a right is forbidden when it can have no
other object than to cause injury to others. '365 Similarly, article 2 of
356. The abuse of rights doctrine has also developed in the United States and, particu-
larly, in Louisiana. See generally A.N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Liability for Abuse of Right, 54
LA. L. Rnv. 1173 (1994); Shael Herman, Classical Social Theories and the Doctrine of
Abuse of Right, 37 LA. L. REv. 747 (1977).
357. For a discussion of the principle of good faith, see generally WERNER LEVI, CON.
TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 209-11 (1979); J.F.
O'CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991); GEORO SCHARZENBERER, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 214-16 (1976); Louis Sohn, Equity in International Law, 82 PRoc. OF
THE AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 277 (1988).
358. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 2.
359. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 1948
I.CJ. 57, 91-92 (Advisory Opinion of May 28).
360. Trm INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS AND READINGS,
supra note 39, at 44.
361. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4,47 (Apr. 9) (separate opinion of Judge
Alvarez).
362. Id.
363. Id. at 47-48.
364. Id. at 47.
365. BURGERLICHES GESE-ZBUCH [BGB] art. 226 (F.R.G.).
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the Swiss Civil Code provided that "[e]veryone is bound to exercise
his rights and to discharge his obligations according to the rules of
good faith. The manifest misuse of a right is not protected by the
law."3" Judge Alvarez suggested that these principles of domestic law
should be transported into international law "for in that law the un-
limited exercise of a right by a State, as a consequence of this absolute
sovereignty, may sometimes cause disturbances or even conflicts
which are a danger to peace."'3 67 Indeed, on some occasions, "clashes
of rights and interests are causes of social unrest and even of wars."z2'o
Referring to the doctrine of abuse of rights and its development
in the decisions in the International Court of Justice, Hersch Lauter-
pacht noted that:
These are but modest beginnings of a doctrine which is full of po-
tentialities and which places a considerable power, not devoid of a
legislative character, in the hands of a judicial tribunal. There is no
legal right, however, well established, which could not, in some cir-
cumstances, be refused recognition on the ground that it has been
abused. The doctrine of abuse or rights is therefore an instrument
which... must be wielded with studied restraint.2,b9
While the abuse of rights doctrine has not yet developed into a
general principle of international law, it is consistent with existing
principles of good faith, nonviolence, and the peaceful settlement of
disputes.370 In this respect, the abuse of rights doctrine is a mere ex-
tension of existing norms of international behavior. Thus, a state
which engages in conduct that is confrontational in nature and uses
military force to assert its rights when nonviolent forms of dispute res-
olution are available would appear to violate the abuse of rights
doctrine.
366. CODE CIvnE SUISSE [ZGB] art. 2 (Switz.). The abuse of rights doctrine is also
found in the French, Spanish, and Japanese legal systems. See generally Vera Bolgar,
Abuse of Rights in France; Germany and Switzerland, 35 L.a L. Rnv. 1015 (1975); Pierre
Catala and John Weir, Delict and Torts: A Study in Parallel Part II, 3S TUL L, R-v. 221,
226-27 (1964); Kazuaki Sono and Yasuhiro Fujioka, The Role of the Abuse of Rights Doc-
trine in Japan, 35 LA. L. RENv. 1037 (1975).
367. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 LCJ. 4, 4S (Apr. 9).
368. I&
369. LAUTERPACHT, Tim DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL L',%;v Bv THIE I .r A.
TIONAL COURT, supra note 325, at 164.
370. According to the Restatement (Third), "[g]eneral principles common to the major
legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in customary law or international agree-
ment, may be invoked as supplementary rules of international law where appropriate."
RsrATENMENr (TrHmD), supra note 243, § 102(4).
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C. Summary
In the final analysis, the validity of the Freedom of Navigation
program must be measured by reference to both legal and political
norms. Certainly, international law provides an arguable basis for the
FON program. State practice is relevant to the development of cus-
tomary international law and the interpretation of treaties. In prac-
tice, the FON program has influenced the development of
international law, as evidenced by the successful resolution of the
Black Sea incident. It should also be recognized that hundreds of
FON operational challenges have been conducted without incident.
And yet, if the purpose of international law is to minimize state
conflict and the potential for violent confrontation, the legitimacy of
the Freedom of Navigation program must be questioned. FON opera-
tional challenges are inherently confrontational precisely because they
challenge disputed claims. As previously indicated, when both states
are equally firm in their resolve to assert their legal position by state
practice, violent confrontations may occur. Moreover, the notion that
state practice is required to challenge disputed claims is prejudicial to
states that are unable to conduct such operations. In this case, there-
fore, might makes right.37' Thus, where both parties seek to affirm
their legal positions through state practice, they should be obligated to
seek dispute settlement. Indeed, international law should not be used
to support such confrontational practices. To do so is contrary to the
most basic principles of international law.
This does not suggest, however, that the Freedom of Navigation
program should not remain an integral component of U.S. maritime
policy. In addition to operational challenges, the FON program also
consists of bilateral and multilateral efforts that affirm U.S. naviga-
tional rights. The United States should continue to pursue these dip-
lomatic efforts. However, it should not engage in maritime operations
merely to assert U.S. navigational rights in disputed waters. If other
foreign policy interests require maritime operations in disputed wa-
ters, these operations should then be conducted. Until such time, the
United States should seek diplomatic solutions, and not engage in
confrontational behavior.
371. See generally Louis HEi N Er Ai., RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE UsE OF FoRcE (2d ed., 1991).
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V. Conclusion
This study recognizes the dynamic relationship between law and
politics. On the one hand, international law is shaped and influenced
by the diverse interests and political concerns of the international
community.37 According to Morton Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Kat-
zenbach, "[flaw exists, and legal institutions operate, only in particular
political contexts. 373 Similarly, Louis Henkin acknowledged that the
separation of law and politics is illusory.374 "In a larger, deeper sense,
law is politics. Law is made by political actors, not by lawyers,
through political procedures, for political ends. The law that emerges
is the result of political forces as are the influences of law on state
behavior."37 Thus, the influence of politics on law is significant.
On the other hand, the influence of international law on politics
is equally significant. The law establishes a framework for interna-
tional issues, giving them form and character. Through this process, it
establishes parameters of acceptable conduct. As international law
becomes more formalized and institutionalized, it gains a greater abil-
ity to influence state behavior. Indeed, international institutions have
the capacity to improve interstate cooperation by reducing transaction
costs, increasing transparency and information flows between states,
and monitoring compliance. 76 In this manner, international institu-
tions influence state behavior and mitigate the consequences of an an-
archic international system where state behavior is typically motivated
by egoistic self-interest.
This dynamic, where law and politics interact is clearly evident in
the Freedom of Navigation program-where the United States closely
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possible into international law).
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guards navigation and overflight rights throughout the world's seas
and oceans under the rubric of the freedom of the seas. Indeed, the
dialectic interaction between law and politics creates a unique rela-
tionship. In the Corfu Channel case, Judge Alvarez noted that social
interdependence does not place law in opposition to politics. Rather,
there is a close relationship between the two. According to Judge
Alvarez:
[P]ure law does not exist: law is the result of social life and evolves
with it; in other words, it is, to a large extent, the effect of politics-
especially of a collective kind-as practiced by the States. We must
therefore beware of considering law and politics as mutually antago-
nistic. Each of them should be permeated by the other.377
This Article has identified the impact of legal norms on state be-
havior as well as the impact of state behavior on the development of
legal norms. Both scholars and practitioners must recognize this fun-
damental interaction which underlies all international behavior.
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